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This is the fourth edition of Soccer Review, a
publication that is made possible by the help of the
Professional Footballers Association. This help comes
without any attempt to exercise any kind of editorial
influence. Again this is a fact worth putting on record
in an era in which financial assistance increasingly
seems to come with strings attached. Of course, one
implication of this benign approach to assistance is
that the PFA carry no responsibility for the views
expressed and arguments developed in the articles
contained in this or in the previous editions, with, of
course, the exception of their own contribution.
In previous editions of the Soccer Review we have
monitored the development of Simon Clifford’s career
in football - the expansion of his Leeds based futebol
de salão coaching network and his ownership and
management of Garforth Town FC. This interview
constitutes our first item in this edition. Over the past
seven to eight years these activities have attracted a
considerable amount of media interest. Yet this
coverage pales before that generated by his brief
partnership with Sir Clive Woodward at
Southampton. In this edition’s interview, conducted
by Patrick Murphy (University of Chester), he gives
his account of how his relationship with Woodward
came about, how it developed and how things
reached such a pitch that he felt he had no choice
but to resign. He also reflects upon his first direct
experience of football at the higher levels and what
he holds to be its shortcomings. The upshot of these
events is that Clifford has returned to Leeds with a
renewed confidence in his methods. Through his
coaching network and the elevation of Garforth Town,
he is determined to demonstrate the greater
effectiveness of his approach to the development
young footballers and, thereby, compel the football
authorities to take note. 
It is undeniably the case that as far as the media are
concerned ‘bad news’ is ‘good news’ and ‘more
positive news’ tends to be ignored or granted only
marginal coverage. While not alone in this regard,
football is certainly one of the more prominent
targets for this treatment. The ferocity of the
newspapers’ circulation war means that it is
seemingly impossible to counter-balance the deluge
of sensational and prurient stories. It is not argued
that newspaper editors and journalists are
malevolently intent on damaging football, but many
of the gratuitous stories they write and run strongly
suggest that they are indifferent to the consequences
they have for the game. They are seemingly
consumed by other agendas. Nevertheless, in the
second article, Gordon Taylor, the Chief Executive of
the PFA, attempts to correct the balance by providing
an over-view of the range of community-centred
activities engaged in by his organisation, his
members and their clubs.
Article 3 is by Gavin Mellor (Manchester
Metropolitan University). He places some of the
activities of the PFA, the clubs and the players in a
broader context. The author provides a follow-up
report to a contribution he made to the Soccer
Review 2003 concerning research he and his
colleagues are undertaking for the Football
Foundation. Their general of area of concern is the
relationship between football clubs and their local
communities. More specifically, the focus of this
article is on the tensions that tend to arise between
clubs pursuing commercial objectives and when they
are performing ostensibly non-profit-making activities
within their communities.
The fourth article is by Stephen Morrow (University of
Sterling). He examines the decline in the competitive
standing of Scotland’s football team, a situation that
finds expression in its present lowly world ranking. He
places this decline in the context of international
processes, such as the consequences of the Bosman
ruling and the influx of overseas players. He also
relates this decline to the lack of adequate facilities
and the relative failure of the youth development
strategies pursued by the Scottish FA.
The next two articles (five and six) are by Roger Penn
(University of Lancaster). In the first one he provides
an overview of some of the new and transformed
stadia that have come to grace the Premier League
in the 1990s and beyond. He sees these edifices as
embodying and evoking powerful emotions that link
these structures to the histories of the clubs and/or to
previous grounds. He argues that these features have
powerful resonance for supporters. Moreover, they
also have explanatory implications for what he sees
as the new forms of behaviour within stadia. He
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argues that these emerging patterns help to account
for the absence of graffiti at Premier League stadia in
contrast to their counterparts in Serie A. (This article
is supplemented by click-on photographs). Penn’s
second paper compares the behaviour of fans in and
around grounds at the elite levels of football in
England and Italy. It complements his first paper in
that it too is based on observational research
conveyed to the reader descriptively and
photographically. It is, however, important to
emphasis that it does not purport to cover disorders
that occur some distance from grounds in the
broader context of match day context and, in our
view, these forms of behaviour continue to be an
element of, at least, football in England.
The seventh article is by Seamus Kelly (University
College Dublin) and Ivan Waddington (University of
Chester, University College Dublin and the University
of Oslo). They explore the relationship between
managers and players with particular reference to the
variation in disciplinary codes and the ways in which
they are enforced in the context of what they describe
as a predominantly ‘robust and masculine culture’.
This enforcement often involves verbal intimidation
that, on occasions, escalates into physical assault,
with one manager resorting to hitting his players on
the head with a cricket bat. It seems that some
players are so used to this culture of intimidation that
they have difficulty in adjusting to less authoritarian,
more democratic styles of management.
The final three articles are by Patrick Murphy. In the
first one (article eight) he revisits the development of
football hooliganism in England over the period from
the late 1950s to 1990. It is a partial synopsis of
the thesis that he and his colleagues have developed
and elaborated upon in four books. It is presented
with the aim of providing a backcloth to the two
pieces that follow. In the second of these
contributions (article nine) he focuses on the
development of counter-hooligan strategies since
1990. He argues that, in regard to football
hooliganism, the 1990s are a much neglected and
little understood decade because views of this period
have tended to be distorted by the over-bearing
influence of the official version. Throughout this
period successive Conservative and Labour
governments cultivated and disseminated the view
that football hooliganism had to all intents and
purposes ceased to be a problem. Murphy tries to
unravel the roots of this misconception. In the final
contribution to this edition (article ten) he explores
the machinations of the legislative process that
paralleled the developments he traced in the previous
article. He concludes that that the period from the
1990s was one in which successive governments set
out to persuade the media and through them the
public at large that the battle against football
hooliganism had been won, but that in the event,
they fell victims to their own self-induced
complacency.
Finally, the incidental photographs for this edition
and the previous editions of Soccer Review have
been provided by Niels Nyholm and we would like to
express our thanks to him.
Patrick Murphy & Ivan Waddington
Department of Sport and Exercise Science
University of Chester2
SOCCER REVIEW 2005 - facilitated by the Professional Footballers Association
The birth of a partnership
PM: Two events seem to stand out from your last year.
Firstly, last season, under your management, Garforth
Town won promotion to the Northern Counties East
League, Premier Division and, secondly, your short-
lived involvement with Sir Clive Woodward at
Southampton. The move to Southampton has
obviously been your most radical departure. To live in
interesting times is a Chinese curse and it would seem
to be an apt description of your last few months at
that club. Therefore, I’d like you to take me through
the whole story beginning with how this partnership
between you and Sir Clive (CW) emerged.
SC: I met Clive for the first time just over a year ago. I
supposed that I was flattered that he had asked to
meet me. We got on straight away. He said he wanted
to get involved in football. Rupert Lowe had made him
an offer when he was still with the England rugby
team but he didn’t want to go into football with
someone who was already well established in the
game. He told me he had met with Trevor Brooking,
Howard Wilkinson, Sammy Lee and Mark Palios and
he concluded that there was only one man he wanted
alongside him and to my surprise I was that man. He
said that he wouldn’t be able to achieve his goals in
football without me. From there on we talked perhaps
eight or nine times a day and over the next few
months our friendship developed. He can be very
persuasive and I started to buy into the whole thing. I
thought that he was a pretty special person.
PM: Was the decision to go to Southampton an
agonising one?
SC: Yes. I kept having doubts about my ability to run
the Leeds end of our operation – the fds coaching
network and Garforth Town. Clive said he would be
happy for me to maintain these commitments. He
and his wife said to me on many occasions that my
Southampton responsibilities would help to boost my
other interests by giving me access to more
prominent players. I changed my mind many times,
but Clive is a very persuasive man. He refuses to
take no for an answer. If I ever sounded negative
about the move, he would fly to Leeds, meet me for
breakfast and persuade me to change my mind. He
wanted me to put pen to paper as soon as possible.
He wanted me to commit myself to the same
contract as him. 
PM: Presumably you met with Rupert Lowe, the
Chief Executive of Southampton, before the deal was
done? How did you take to him?
SC: I quickly developed a bond with him. While he
is Chief Executive of Southampton this didn’t get in
the way of us quickly developing a close relationship.
PM: Were you surprised that you took to him so
readily because his public persona seems to be quite
diffident?
SC: I agree. I was very wary at first because of the
image I’d formed of him through the media, but the
reality couldn’t have been more different. I never
found him anything other than honest and
straightforward. I really like the guy. His attitude
towards me made me feel really confident about the
whole venture. Clive and I were given his
unequivocal backing. We were given very good
contracts and, in addition to this, Clive and I made a
separate agreement that whatever we did in football
over the next fifteen years we would work together
and I would be paid 75% of whatever he received.
As regards the work itself, I have to say that I was
excited by the prospect. I thought that all the
experience I’d had to date with young players could
now be applied in the context of a big club.
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A brief stay on the South Coast: an interview
with Simon Clifford, the Director of Garforth
Town and the Futebol de Salão (fds)
Coaching Schools Network by Patrick Murphy
Plan A
PM: What was ‘Plan A’ at Southampton?
SC: In effect Clive was offered the job of manager, if
not in name. While this sounds premature - given
that he is still taking his coaching qualification - he
was going there to become the manager. It was just
a question of biding his time. The initial plan was
that if Southampton were relegated at the end of the
2004-05 season we could take over in the summer.
He would become the manager and I would become
the head coach. However, if the club stayed up it
was anticipated that Harry Redknapp would have
carried on because neither Clive nor I had the UEFA-
Pro licence. I had already expressed my reservations
to Clive about us taking over for the 2005-06
season. I said to him that if the two guys in charge
of the first team at the start of the 2005-06 season
are you and me it will be ludicrous. I said to him are
you prepared to stand there with 30,000 people
chanting:  ‘You don’t know what you’re doing’. It will
start up within five minutes and the press will go
mad. I think Rupert’s attitude was – ‘Damn it, - let’s
go for the radical approach’. But it was just too
radical, even for me. We needed someone with
experience at our side. In fact this lack of caution
made me to have some reservations about the
judgment of Clive and Rupert. 
PM: So what was the outcome?
SC: Since I didn’t see plan A as being feasible, my
alternative idea was that Clive and I should start by
working with the reserve team. My argument was
that if we had a year with the reserves and achieved
a reasonable degree of success we could win the
players’ respect. So, in the event, we settled on this
approach. Rupert made it clear to us that come hell
or high water we would be in charge of the first team
for the 2006-07 season. He mentioned Burley and
Tigana, but over the preceding six months Clive had
built what he thought was a good relationship with
Harry. Whether it was a genuine relationship or one
based more on expediency I don’t know. I think that
Harry knew why Clive was coming in and he was
ready to quit last summer. But I think that Clive felt
more threatened by a Burley or Tigana.
PM: I think most people in football would see
Redknapp as old school and that, while Burley may
have constituted more of a threat to CW’s ambitions,
he would be likely to be more receptive to
Woodward’s ideas.
SC: Partly because of Harry’s age and the fact that
he seemed to tolerate us, we stuck with him.
PM: So CW doesn’t see himself as Southampton’s
Director of Football?
SC: No. He wants to be the manager. He just wants
to focus on first team affairs and with someone
–originally me - as first team coach. He was given
his present job to prepare himself for this task. They
gave me a job. They called me ‘head of sports
science’. This was changed to something else within
two weeks, but they were just nonsense titles. 
Encountering resistance
PM: So what were your first days at the club like?
SC: When I first arrived at Southampton my hopes
were high. A document had been approved by the
board two weeks before my arrival and this was a
blueprint for how we would take the club forward
over the next four or five years. Harry agreed to
mentor Clive as manager and me as first team
coach. Clive had a meeting at Harry’s house and
Harry signed up to this arrangement. So when I
arrived I thought that everyone was on board with
this vision and would offer me support. But I was
soon brought face to face with reality. Things were
pretty difficult from the off. What I didn’t realise was
that because of the salary I was receiving and the
position I would take, there was a great deal of
animosity and resentment towards me. I didn’t know
any of the other guys there and, initially, I naively
assumed that we would all be pulling in the same
direction. I thought that everybody would want to get
on with me. It didn’t take long to realise that there
was a real coldness towards me. There were petty
things like people making things as difficult as they
could for me. Equipment that should have been
readily available was locked-up.
PM: Do you think someone was overseeing this
strategy of obstruction?
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SC: You couldn’t put all these obstacles in our way
without Harry’s blessing. My one condition for taking
the helm the following year was having one season
with the reserves and Rupert agreed. On this basis,
Clive wanted to ring fence the reserves and then
ensure that they embarrassed the first team with
their success. We wanted to have the reserve squad
training three times as hard as the first team squad
and developing better techniques. It would have
almost been a club within a club. But these plans
were thwarted. Stewart Henderson, the reserve team
manager, complained to Harry and received his
backing. Clive said we better go along with that and
advised me to be patient. So we settled for being
assistant coaches. Come the first reserves match
Henderson told us that we weren’t allowed in the
dressing room or in the dugout. We were assigned to
the stands. How does that square with being
assistant coaches? But Clive again urged caution,
saying we should just bide our time. This situation
continued all the time I was there. Clive promised
me that things would change, but they never did.
Nothing ever happened.
PM: Are there any other examples of obstacles being
put in your way?
SC: Too many to mention. For example, Clive and I
made a big effort with the fitness guys from the
academy and the first team and we had a long session
with them. The next day they just blanked us. Later
we were informed that Dave Bassett had told them to
ignore us. He said it was either ‘them or us’. The
result was that nobody on the staff took a blind bit of
notice of us and I probably bore the brunt of this
hostility. At one point I said to Clive ‘there’s going to
be blood on the floor here at some time so we might
as well get some of it over with now rather than later’.
Coaching the young players
PM: Given all these obstacles, how did you spend
your time?
SC: I was the first in most days, around 6.50 am.
When we were both in our office, there were times
when we had nothing to do. On occasions we were so
bored that we used to compete to answer the phone
when it rang. The one thing we were allowed to do
relatively unhindered was work with some of the
young players. We did at least have Harry’s agreement
that we could coach the young players who had left
the Academy and perhaps weren’t going to figure
greatly in the first team. This concession fitted in with
Harry’s spin that my coaching was for kids.
PM: At the moment Southampton seem to have an
excellent group of young players. What impression
did you form of the youth set-up there?
SC: While Southampton have spent a deal of money
on the Academy, I have to say I was expecting a
great deal more. The coaching and practising I
witnessed was as poor as I’ve seen anywhere. The
first day I arrived I attended the Annual Academy
Banquet. There were hundreds present, young lads
and their parents. Huw Jennings, the Director of the
Academy, addressed them. His basic message was
‘Lads we can’t promise that you’re going to be a
footballer’. It was one of the most depressing
presentations I’ve heard in my life. He then spent the
next 30 minutes trying to sell them Umbro boots. At
first I couldn’t get my head round how the Academy
squad has done so well and Southampton have
produced such a talented group of young players.
However, I soon came to appreciate that it was
largely down to the ability of a scout called Malcolm
Elias. He is, in my opinion, the most capable man on
the football side at Southampton. The majority of the
talented players had been ‘bought’ at 15 or 16 from
other clubs. Working with these and other young
players was for me the high point of my time at
Southampton. To be given – albeit begrudgingly –
fifteen junior internationals to work with every day
was exciting. When I first met them the prevailing
ethos was do as little as possible. If any player did
anything extra he was referred to as a ‘busy b------d’.
Although Theo Walcott was the star, I could see that
the toughest lad in the group was Leon Best. I
needed to get him on my side. I asked Leon if he
would take the other lads into town to buy the
special fds footwear for our evening training sessions.
The morning session was often a technical topic for
an hour. In the evening we would play fds in a
school gym to music, as is my custom. I led the
morning sessions and they were a great success.
They would arrive at 7.30. am – which in itself is
quite radical- have breakfast and start work about
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8.15. At my first meeting with the group, in contrast
to Huw Jenning’s approach, I said to them let’s not
be the best in Southampton, but in Britain or the
world. Some afternoons I would ring them and if
they weren’t doing anything we would go to David
Lloyd’s and do the fds skills badge in the dance hall.
I’d time them and film them.
PM: What form did the practice sessions take?
SC: We did a lot of sessions nine against nine. I felt
we had a big problem converting chances into goals.
In the sessions that they had been used to a striker
might get three or four scoring opportunities. I
arranged their practice in such a way as to ensure
that they got five or six hundred opportunities to
shoot into a little goal. Clive and I filmed these
sessions, using a programme called dart-fish. We also
invited along two professors from Bath. They were
going to do the biomechanical analyses of the
players. One of my regrets is not being able to
continue my work with those guys. The young players
were buying into my approach. Leon Best’s sister
rang me and said that he’d never enjoyed training
before. Nathan Dyer went out on loan to Burnley for
a period. He rang me one day and said ‘Simon it’s
the same here as at Southampton. We get two days
off a week.’ The measure of how they were
responding to these sessions was that when lads
were injured they would still turn up. For example, on
one occasion Martin Cranie and Matthew Mills played
for the first team against Watford, yet they still turned
up and did the accompanying music for me. Leon
Best turned up when he was injured. When Theo
Walcott got into the first team Harry barred him from
training with me, but he still came to the evening
sessions and just sat on the bench. It became a very
well integrated group. After Theo started scoring for
the first team he said some really complimentary
stuff about me in an interview. That was great at the
time, but I also think it intensified the management
team’s hostility towards me. What I was able to
achieve with these young players was done against
the backcloth of a general hostility towards me. For
example, on one occasion at a reserve game, Nathan
Dyer and Leon Best came to sit with me. They said:
‘We really feel sorry for you because we have been
told to ignore everything you say’.
PM: Did you ask them who had given them this
instruction?
SC: No. It wouldn’t have been fair to put them on
the spot. Redknapp’s men were always on the
lookout for any way to undermine my position. On
one occasion Martin Cranie did a morning session
with me. I pulled him out of it early. Later on he did
a first team session and pulled a hamstring.
Needless to say, I got the blame. Harry told some
journalists that they had lost him because Clifford’s
over-training him. 
Blood on the floor
PM: Was it all just sniping or were there any major
bust-ups? Did you ever retaliate?
SC: While I was there we had two meetings for
coaches led by Clive. Around fourteen guys were
present. At the first meeting someone made a
critical remark about me and I responded. Before
the second meeting – this was held a couple of
weeks before my departure - Clive asked me not to
react if anyone criticised me. He said that I should
just bite my tongue. Harry was present at this one.
He sat there with his feet on the table. It was clear
to me that Dave Bassett had been instructed to
undermine me. On the Friday before this meeting
Clive had asked me to watch a player, a forward, we
had been working with and who was presently out
on loan. Halfway through the meeting Clive - and
remember he’d advised me not to speak - asked me
for my appraisal of the player. I didn’t make a big
deal about it. I just said that he had done OK. He
did a substantial amount of closing down, performed
his defensive duties. He hadn’t achieved a great
deal in attack, but I added, in fairness to the lad,
that the service he received hadn’t been wonderful.
Nothing controversial. Bassett immediately
responded by saying: ‘That’s f-----g funny Simon’
cause Howard Wilkinson said he’s f-----g s--t.’ He
was clearly trying to rile me, but at that point I
simply said that I was just reporting upon his
performance in one game. It’s worth noting that the
lad in question was one of our academy players. You
would have thought the Academy Director would
have been on his feet defending him from this kind
of unwarranted abuse… 
The article in question
PM: But given that this meeting was a couple of
weeks before your departure, this confrontation
couldn’t have been the final straw?
SC: No. That was triggered by an article I did on
how I thought we could change football. Initially
Clive said it was great. This was at a time when I felt
that I was really getting somewhere with the young
lads. Then the day after it was published - it was a
Friday - I arrived at the training ground at quarter to
seven to prepare for my usual session at half past
seven, but no one turned up. I went to look for the
players in the changing room and discovered that
someone had photocopied the article and stuck a
copy on every player’s locker. It looked like a serial
killer’s pad. The main point made in the article was
that I thought professional footballers should work
twice as hard as they are accustomed to do. Clearly,
the aim in putting copies up in the locker room was
to point out to the players, particularly the ones who
were getting on with me, that this is what Clifford
really thinks of you. He thinks you’re all lazy. I ripped
them down. 
The view from Leeds
PM: What happened in the immediate aftermath of
your exit?
SC: After leaving, I spent a day with a solicitor. It
wasn’t because I wanted to seek compensation.
Quite the reverse, I wanted to make sure that I
couldn’t be sued for breach of contract. In the course
of the week after my exit Rupert tried,
unsuccessfully, to persuade me to come back.
PM: What of your relationship with CW?
SC: To be fair, on one level I suppose we did
complement one another. He used to invite me to the
boardroom for a meal, but I had no interest in doing
that sort of thing. He was great at all that. He is a
diplomat and a politician and I’m not. 
PM: CW is clearly a very persuasive man. He
persuaded you to buy into his vision of the future.
Therefore, it comes as a surprise to me that he
seems to have had so little to say and be so non-
interventionist at Southampton.
SC: Rupert appointed Clive and Clive recruited me
because we were outside the football box. I was
brought in to initiate radical change. That’s what
Rupert and Clive wanted. One of Clive’s key phrases
is that he ‘wants to turn football upside down and rip
it inside-out’.
While this is what he wants to do, he doesn’t tell
anyone. He is caught between wanting to change
things and wanting to be accepted by the football
fraternity. The problem was that his wish to get on
with the old guard meant that I was left without any
back-up, without any support. On occasions Rupert
wanted to step in and sort problems out, but he was
constrained because that was the job he was paying
Clive to do.
PM: So what’s your relationship with CW now?
SC: We still communicate. But from the outset, I
don’t think Clive really understood what sort of man I
am. Anyone could do what I was being allowed to do
at Southampton. Given the kind of guy I am, I
couldn’t sit there quietly and simply take the money.
I don’t want to take money under false pretences. He
might as well have set fire to my salary.
PM: You said that he also seems to fear the media.
How, for example, has he reacted to the series of
cartoons of him in The Guardian?
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SC: One in particular made me laugh. It said that
‘Cliffo may have gone, but every leader needs his
right hand man’. (It gave some examples like Sooty
needs Sweep etc.) Nevertheless, it continued:
‘Cliffo’s spirit lives on and at 4.00 am tomorrow the
players will be running backward wearing wet suits’
PM: So you looked at these cartoon, but he wouldn’t?
SC: He wouldn’t read any newspapers. I think this
started with the negative coverage of the Lions tour.
That hurt him. He would telephone me and ask me
to tell him what was being written. In fairness, you
can be honest with him on a face-to-face basis and
he will take and respond to criticisms. He certainly
doesn’t want to surround himself with ‘yes’ men. 
PM: Apart from Rupert Lowe and the satisfaction that
you derived from working with the young players was
there no one that offered you consistent support?
SC: No. Not really. While he probably won’t thank me
for saying it, Kevin Bond isn’t a bad lad. He was
pretty decent to me. I think he felt sorry for me. I
think the whole atmosphere towards me can be
summed up by a chat one morning. He said that he
was sorry I’d been stonewalled, but that I should
appreciate that football is the most insecure
profession in the world. People are just scared for
their jobs because they don’t really know what’s going
on. So it’s not personal. I thanked him for ringing me.
When I was down there, to be seen to be speaking to
me openly would not have been well received.
PM: Of course we can’t know how the situation at
Southampton will develop, but CW does seem to have
been very fortunate that his path crossed Rupert
Lowe’s because there can’t be many chief executives of
big clubs that would be prepared to risk such an
innovation. If this opportunity is foreclosed, he may not
get another chance. From what you said earlier, CW
will not have welcomed the appointment of George
Burley. Burley has got a good record. He’s a competent
manager. He has inherited a promising group of young
players. He stands a reasonable chance of making a
success of the job. Where would that leave CW?
SC: It will create a problem for him. I don’t know
what he’ll do, but I don’t think Clive will play second
fiddle to anyone for long.
PM: When you say that CW wants to be a manager
and not a director of football and he wanted you to
be the first team coach I’m not really clear about
how he saw his job.
SC: I don’t know. In an interview he gave to Patrick
Barclay of The Telegraph he said that he couldn’t
imagine doing this without me. Of course, he could
still make a good fist of it, but in truth I don’t know
what he’ll do now I’ve quit.
PM: Was not the problem his timing? Should he not
have got his qualifications before being appointed?
SC: Yes. It was far too early and too high up the
football pyramid. Once there, I was impatient to get
on with the job. But it was Clive’s impatience that
put me in that position. There was also the question
of the money. Clive also wanted a certain life-style.
All I can say is that Clive was in too much of a hurry
to be interested in this kind of approach.
PM: So the irony is that while CW wanted you
because he believed you had certain qualities, the
situation in which he placed you was self-defeating
because it stifled these very qualities.
SC: Yes. There wasn’t enough scope for me to use
what talents I have. Now I’m back in Leeds I’m free
of these kinds of constraints.
A job too far
PM: Even given a man of your undoubted energy,
wasn’t the Southampton job stretching you too far?
SC: I agree. But in the first instance, if the
Southampton job had meant me giving up my other
activities, I wouldn’t have accepted it. In retrospect
keeping all those balls in the air was impossible. Had
we taken over the management and first team
coaching, I would have had to delegate most of my
other responsibilities. Initially Clive was eager to send
me home on a Thursday afternoon and I didn’t have
to return to Southampton until the Sunday night.
Nevertheless, the pressure was soon on to treat it as
a full-time job and over the last three weeks before
my departure, I was more or less full-time. Even at
weekends I had to watch under-18 games just for
the sake of appearances and this annoyed me.
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The state of play
PM: Before going to Southampton you didn’t have a
very high opinion of football management and
coaching. Did your experience there harden your
views?
SC: Near the beginning I said to Clive that if my stint
at Southampton ends in six weeks I’ll go back to
Leeds fired-up and enthused. Previously I thought
that I was right. Now I know I am. It was such an
eye-opener. The prevailing view is that if you haven’t
played the game professionally you’re no one. It’s a
self-serving monopoly. If you’re not an insider you’re
excluded. Maybe if you’re prepared to treat them as
the font of all wisdom for long enough they might
come to accept you. But in my view the whole thing
is a bluff. We had Prozone there. It’s a useful piece
of software. I never saw Harry look at it once. 
PM: What would be your major criticisms of the
prevailing approach to coaching?
SC: I would make two general criticisms. One of the
biggest shortcomings with coaching is that the
coaches don’t seem to have any idea of the potential
of the players – both technically and physically. Their
horizons are too low. The other day Trevor Brooking
paid me a compliment. He said that large chunks of
my programme should be adopted for the
development of young players. While it is easier to
induct 8 to 12 years olds into this programme and
it’s much more difficult to recapture the lost ground
with 20 year olds, its not impossible and that is
what I was trying to do at Southampton.
PM: But you were playing catch-up?
SC: Yes, but if players and coaches are willing to put
in the extra time and effort after team training it’s
surprising what can be achieved. At Garforth Town
our most improved player is Brett Renshaw. He was
at Garforth when I arrived. York City came in for him
in the summer. He’s 23 years old and not an fds
graduate. He has really bought into my approach and
he’s now employed full-time as a youth coach.
PM: I have read newspaper accounts of the changing
room incident and the central thrust of the article in
question was that because of the culture into which
professional footballers are brought up they don’t work
hard enough at developing their skills and fitness.
From your point of view, would one manifestation of
this be the shortage of quality England players who
are comfortable on their left-foot?
SC: We have seven and eight year olds that are
completely bilateral. They have no favoured foot. Yet
it gets dismissed as kids-stuff and it’s said that
professional footballers shouldn’t be doing this sort of
thing. My response is perhaps they wouldn’t need to
work at developing these skills if they’re mastered
them at an earlier age. At Southampton we had
squares that were ten metres apart with a player in
each square. One player passed the ball to a player
in another square and the receiving player had to
control it first time and pass it back – all within his
square. Well, it proved to be very challenging even
when they were using their stronger foot. Their
control with their weaker foot was just pathetic. In
another exercise I asked players to hit a target 10
metres away. I also asked them to estimate how
many times they would hit it out of 30. They began
by saying 25/26 times. No one scored more than
two or three out of 30. And, that was with their
stronger foot. While some of the coaches thought
that I shouldn’t be asking players to do this sort of
thing, the players themselves bought into it and there
was some improvement in the course of a few
weeks. Harry said that I was demeaning the players
asking them to perform these sorts of exercises. In
some ways I agree because it shouldn’t be necessary
to start them at this level. The fact that professional
footballers can’t do it is ridiculous. What are we
supposed to do? Just ignore the fact that they
haven’t got these basis skills. How many times have
you heard commentators complain that in England
we give the ball away too easily? This is why – a
deficiency in basic ball skills.
PM: But there have been young players in the past
who have exhibited wonderful ball skills, but who
never made it in the professional game. Isn’t this the
kind of thing that Redknapp has in mind when he
refers to your approach as ‘kids stuff?
SC: Yes, I agree. Right from the start we have been
aware of this and we have placed great emphasis on
the physical side of the game, both in terms of
strength and stamina. We didn’t want to produce
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great technicians who were simply blown away in
the heat of battle and this brings me to my second
major criticism of the present set-up. I wasn’t
impressed by the level of fitness of the first team
squad at Southampton. If you calculate the league
position they would have occupied on the basis of
their first half performances this season and compare
it with that of the second half of matches, the
outcome is very interesting. Their first half
performance would put Southampton in third place.
In contrast their second half performance would
place them seventeenth. In large measure this stark
difference has to be down to fitness.
PM: In many matches one sees the game being
stretched in the last 30 minutes. I appreciate that an
element in this process can be one team throwing
caution to the wind in an attempt to secure an
equalising or a winning goal, but could it not also be
partially related to fitness?
SC: Definitely. The first match after I left Southampton,
they were playing Leeds and it couldn’t have provided
a better demonstration of this point. Southampton
were three nil up at half time and some of their fans
were chanting: ‘Are you watching Simon Clifford?’ The
final result was Southampton 3 Leeds 4 and some
Leeds fans were chanting: ‘Simon Clifford’s watching
you’. I must confess, that was a source of some
gratification to me.
Back in harness
PM: Let’s turn to Garforth Town. While they gained
promotion last year, they don’t appear to be doing so
well this season. Presumably someone has stepped
into your shoes and taken over the management and
coaching duties?
SC: Last year I had two coaches working with me.
They understood how I worked and they took over.
Unfortunately, it hasn’t worked. The success of the
fds coaching network is assured, but when I was
away at Southampton it became clear to me that my
lofty ambitions for Garforth Town are not going to be
realised without my hands-on presence.
PM: So you are back in harness at Garforth?
SC: Yes. The progress we need to make doesn’t faze
me and the players are more confident when I’m
around. Discipline was a central element of our
success last season. Of the 23 games that I was in
charge we won 20, drew 2 and lost 1.
PM: Last year’s reserves consisted of lads from your
local network and you said that your intention was to
bring in some lads from your fds network on a
nationwide basis for the 2005-06 season. What is
the situation? 
SC: In the event there were just two. Lee Jones
came from Arbroath and John Farnworth from
Manchester. They both now reside in Leeds and next
year there will be a few more.
PM: Are you disappointed that there haven’t been
more?
SC: Probably. We have to address the issue of
accommodation. That’s the biggest obstacle to more
coming here. I’m hoping that this summer we bring
in another 5 or 6. The first team is still Leeds heavy.
We began this season with five fds lads in the first
team. They are between 17 and 18 years of age. So
we are clearly the youngest team in the league. Since
I’ve come back we have won 3 games and lost one.
But realistically we have got to write this year off. I’m
still a bit pre-occupied with the residue of the
Southampton experience. I haven’t really started to
focus properly. Last year I spent 3 to 4 hours each
evening on the team, coaching or assessing the
opposition. I was obsessed and it’s that level of
commitment that’s been missing.
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The assembling cohorts
PM: In the next few years you’re going to reach a
stage where substantial numbers of youngsters begin
to graduate from your coaching schools. Give us
some names to look out for. 
SC: There’s Seb Muddel. He is playing in Norwich
reserves. In fact he is the youngest player to have
ever played for Norwich reserves. He was 14 or 15.
Norwich Academy played Southampton Academy the
other week and he got ‘man of the match’. Seb is still
in regular contact with me. He’s totally committed to
my philosophy and practises religiously for two hours
virtually everyday. There’s Oliver Hotchkiss at Leeds.
He’s under-15s, but he played under -19s this year.
He’s the highest scorer for any age group at Leeds
this season as, indeed, he was last year. The club
have offered him a scholarship and a professional
contract, but there are eight clubs that are interested
in him and he’s still weighing up where his future
lies. In addition to his training at Leeds United, he
also does 16 hours fds training each week. There’s
Micah Richards at Man City. Travis Wheatle has just
got into the Welsh under-16s. There’s Nick Reilly at
Celtic. Jason St Juste is a good prospect but he’s
been treated appallingly at Southampton.
PM: Why? Is it because he was seen as one of your
boys?
SC: Definitely. Jason went from Garforth Town to
Darlington. He got six ‘man of the match’ awards. He
was young player of the year and he won the goal of
the season competition for the seniors. His contract
ran out and on my recommendation, Southampton
signed him. He’s an attacking mid-fielder and totally
two–footed. He can play anywhere across the mid-
field. They put him in the reserves and played him at
fullback. I think the reserve team coach wanted him
to fail. I’m still in touch with Jason and he told me
that he had been involved in a training game. He
was played at right-back. It seems that the fitness
coach and the under-18s coach filled the right and
left mid-field positions. Draw your own conclusions.
PM: Look five years ahead. How many graduates from
your soccer schools will be playing in the Premier
League? How many will be full internationals?
SC: I would say between five and ten. I think that
the lads who make it to the Premier League will be
quite exceptional and so I think most of them will be
in with a chance of international honours.
PM: I’m surprised by the modesty of your estimate of
five to ten. I would have anticipated that you would
have come up with a substantially higher figure.
You’re normally more bullish than that. Given the
number of graduates coming from your soccer schools
in the next five years, five to ten making it to the
Premier League doesn’t sound particularly ambitious.
SC: Well, I think that’s a realistic figure. We have
probably got around a 100 lads (15 to 18 years of
age) at professional clubs at the moment. I can only
guess how many of these will actually come through,
but given current patterns of development, 5% to
10% reaching Premier League level strikes me as
realistic estimate. If we can achieve this level of
success it should have a snowball effect. It may even
force the powers that be in football to take my
approach more seriously.
Final thoughts
PM: Bearing in mind the old aphorism – ‘never say
never’, would you ever change your mind and
consider rejoining CW?
SC: No. I’ve got such an enormous task on here. It’s
enough of a challenge. I feel as if I’ve wasted a year
of my life. During my absence the Garforth players
have been disoriented. If I’d been at Southampton
much longer I think we would have lost some of our
younger players.
PM: So you’re now resolved to use Garforth Town as
the vehicle for demonstrating the merits of your
approach.
SC: Yes. I can achieve what I want to achieve here.
There’s no politics. There’s nobody obstructing me,
except perhaps the local FA.
PM: It’s going to be a long haul getting Garforth into
the Conference and then the Football League.
Couldn’t you have made life easier for yourself by
taking over a club in the Conference or the lower
reaches of the Football League?
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SC: I’ve made my bed. What appeals to me about
the Garforth Town project is that it looks to be
impossible. Come the New Year, my mind will be
clear and there will be no stopping me. If I’ve got
any talent it’s my drive and imagination. The whole
Southampton experience has just been a distraction.
Before I went there the ideas used to pour out of me.
I’ve only just begun to think creatively and start
writing again. It has been as if I have had writer’s
block. I feel as if I’ve been in a fog. The one positive
lesson that I derived from my Southampton
experience is that it makes me realise and appreciate
what we have began to build here in Leeds.
(This interview was conducted in Leeds on 27th
December 2005)
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Gordon Taylor, Chief Executive of the
Professional Footballers Association
Whilst football and footballers are very quickly the
subject of controversial headlines and accusations as
soon as there is any misdemeanour on or off the
pitch, the general public is rarely given an opportunity
to know about the good works that the PFA, football
clubs and footballers do on behalf of society in
general and local communities in particular. This
social responsibility and awareness has been taken on
board by players and football clubs and is quite
unique to our profession. Such an obligation  -
employees willingly agreeing to do hours of public
relations and community activities each week - is
unheard of in any other employment contract. This
obligation is now accepted by players and clubs as
simply coming with the territory. This article offers a
glimpse into some of these activities, activities which
for the most part go unrecognised and unpublicised.
The PFA – Inspiring Health in Society
During the past twelve months the Government has
been keen to provide leadership and guidance on what
constitutes healthy choices and to set out a vision for
making those choices easier. Given its cultural
centrality, it is not surprising that football is playing a
leading part in this strategy, with footballers acting as
role models and inspirational figures for many people
across society. The Football task force in its research
document ‘Investing in the Community’ states:
‘Society has no more influential role models
than it’s professional footballers. Children
and young boys in particular will imitate
anything they see favourite players do – good
or bad, on and off the pitch – and will
always listen carefully to what they have to
say. This is an onerous responsibility to bear.
Young players turn professional because they
want to play football and not to set a moral
lead to a younger generation. But it also
places football in a powerful position of
influence and gives the game unique
potential to make a positive contribution to
the life of the nation.’
It is, therefore, reassuring and refreshing to see so
many players displaying a commitment to community
work and treating it as part and parcel of their job
and doing so in spite of the fact that some of them
get little relief from being in the public spotlight.
Over 7 million adults and 5 million children play
football each year and over half a million people
attend professional matches each week. It is this
mass appeal that is being utilised to reinforce health
messages and build upon football’s and the PFA’s
track record of involvement in promoting healthy
lifestyles. As part of the campaign to use the power
of football to promote a wide range of educational,
social inclusion, and  community initiatives, the PFA
and its members are endeavouring to reach those
groups who are notoriously difficult to engage by
other means, such as young men.
The PFA’s commitment to the Governments Health
initiative include many examples of the inspirational
work undertaken by the players as role models
including: 
i) Encouraging young people to drink milk – 
The PFA worked with Dairy UK and the Milk
Development Council on a promotion to
encourage the nation’s children to drink more
milk. The promotion used James Beattie as the
face of the campaign, which involved milk bars
being taken into 500 schools and over 200
million milk cartons branded as ‘Milk-the drink of
the Professional Footballer’.  
The PFA and its Membership’s
contribution to Government Health
Initiatives and Social Improvement
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ii) Raising awareness of testicular cancer – 
Cancer charities have linked with the PFA and
FA to promote awareness and self-examination
for testicular and prostrate cancers. This
included adverts in match programmes and half-
time announcements, posters in players’
changing rooms and providing information for
club doctors to pass on to their teams. Thierry
Henry was used as the face of this campaign. 
iii) Promoting positive health choices – 
Manchester City and Manchester United football
clubs have been instrumental in utilising the
influence that players can have on the lives of
both children and adults within their own local
communities. These include initiatives such as
cardiovascular rehabilitation, weekly health
walks, dental health programmes, free blood
pressure testing, and campaigns on anti-
smoking, drugs, alcohol and many more.
Danny Mills, Manchester City and England player
commented at a recent anti-smoking campaign:
‘As a premiership footballer it is vital that I keep
fit and healthy so that I can perform at my full
potential. It’s in the closing minutes of matches
when games are won and lost so it is important
that I am fitter and have more energy than my
opponent. That is why I don’t smoke – smoking
damages your lungs, making it harder to run
fast or to keep going as long – I don’t smoke
because I want to win’.
This is exactly the type of message that enables
players to reach and inspire young people and make
a difference in their local communities. The
government view the health of the nation as a major
concern and priority for intervention. As Richard
Caborn, MP, Minister for Sport recently put it: 
‘We are facing a time bomb in the state of our
health. A recent National Office Report suggests
that obesity costs the UK economy £2 billion
each year, and the NHS, £500 million.’
All 92 Premier League and Football League clubs
utilise players as a central means by which they fulfil
their own social responsibilities to the communities
they serve and the importance of this role should
never be underestimated. In fact the PFA were the
initiators of the National Football in the Community
Schemes in the mid-nineteen eighties, at a time
when the image of football was in dire need of an
extensive overhaul.
The PFA’s initiative has prove to be a catalysis in the
development of the football in the community
movement and a major source of inspiration.
Supporting the work of local organisations such as
schools and hospitals has become a routine
commitment for professional clubs and part of the
weekly round of a professional footballer. As a result
of these co-ordinated activities football clubs have
become the hub of their communities.
Government departments, NHS trusts, local
authorities, and football organisations have already
combined to use the power of football to promote a
wide range of educational, social inclusion, and
community initiatives. Marketing players as role
models is one of the main themes behind the
partnership work aimed at engaging with local
communities. Other themes include: 
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Promoting physical activity – Encouraging
participation in football, whatever a person’s ability,
makes a contribution towards health improvement
and reduces the risk of chronic diseases. It can also
have a positive effect on mental health by boosting
self-esteem.
Promoting healthy living for children – Innovative
learning can draw upon football-based examples to
inspire young people to improve their diet and
nutrition and adopt healthier lifestyles.
Promoting social inclusion – Community-based
football coaching programmes can be used to target
socially excluded groups and, in the course of
which, key messages about health issues and the
dangers of drugs and smoking can be communicated
and re-enforced.
Providing health facilities at football grounds –
There is the potential for football clubs to work with
their respective NHS trusts to develop joint facilities
at football grounds and attract people who may not
otherwise utilise local services. As the partnership
with the Government develops, we must not forget
that the PFA and the players in particular will
continue to be central to this formula, like no other
industry, and the inspiration to millions for the future
health of our society. 
Kick Racism Out of Football
This campaign, now entering its twelfth year, was
founded by the PFA. It has set precedents, both in
terms of its objectives and in terms of its success in
ensuring that the whole of football to unites against
racism. The ‘Kick It Out’ Week of Action is now
recognised as a major part of the football calendar and
all 92 clubs have demonstrated their commitment to
the cause by displaying banners in their stadia and
highlighting the campaign’s activities in their
programmes, They stage half-time events, team
managers, club administrators and ground staff wear
‘Kick It Out’ badges, team managers and players wear
T-shirts displaying the ‘Kick It Out’ message.
As well as this community 700 groups were able to
host activities with the Kick It Out Community Chest
Grants which are part-funded by the Association.
Kick It Out has developed the Racial Equality
Standard for FA Premier League clubs to help them
understand the importance of race equality within
the club at all levels. This will also be rolled out to
Football League clubs. Notts County will be the first
club to receive the standard.
Players supporting the campaign include the entire
England squad and they wore the ‘Kick It Out’ badge
on their playing strip against Holland and they
regularly wear the T-Shirts with the ‘Kick It Out’ logo
during training sessions. The PFA distributed post
cards featuring John Terry and Ashley Cole wearing
these T-shirts asking players to sign-up as anti-
racism ambassadors. Over 500 responses have been
received and I would like to take this opportunity to
thank everyone who has committed to this
campaign. 
Show Racism the Red Card
This organisation was set up to harness the potential
that professional footballers have as role models in
the campaign to combat racism. Over 50 posters
have been produced and over 40,000 pin badges
and 100,000 stickers were distributed last year. This
organisation has provides an exemplary
demonstration of the way in which players can be
used to motivate and inspire young people with anti-
racist ideals. The campaign has been conducted in
partnership with nearly 50 clubs over the past year
and several players - Rio Ferdinand, Joe Cole,
Thierry Henry and Shaka Hislop among them - have
appeared in a promotional video and participated in
presentations around the country. In 2005 a new
educational DVD was launched and distributed free
of charge to all schools in Scotland thanks to the
generosity of the Scottish Assembly. 
Black Victorians Exhibition
The PFA worked with Manchester Arts Gallery to
present an exhibition aimed at demonstrating the
contribution made by black people to Victorian
society, among them the first black footballer Arthur
Wharton who made his debut in 1887. A number of
school children attended the exhibition during ‘Kick It
Out’s’ Week of Action and they met Louis Saha.
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Asians in Football
A report by the National Asians in Football
Committee, released a decade after the publication
of original ironically entitled report  “Asians Can’t
Play Football” report found that Asians are still
excluded at every level of the game. Although we
now have four professionals of Asian origin (Zesh
Rehman, Fulham; Harpal Singh, Stockport County;
Michael Chopra, Newcastle; Adhan Ahmed,
Huddersfield) this is massively under-representative
of the number of Asians playing football. 
Popular myths and stereo-types surrounding Asian
players - they have to go to mosque, it would interfere
with training, they eat the wrong type of food, they are
the wrong build, their parents don’t want them to be
footballers - need to be dispelled in order that Asians
can break through into professional football.
The PFA sponsored the Asians Can Play football
conference which looked at ways of addressing this
problem and finding solutions. These will be presented
in a paper by Dr John Williams of Leicester University
to work towards ensuring greater representation of the
Asian community in the professional game.
National Game
Since the incidents at and surrounding the England v.
Spain game in November 2004, there have been a
number of initiatives to ensure our players know that
racism will not be tolerated in our game.
• Players at the England game have spoken out
regarding the incident and have the full support
of their Association in these matters.
• Over 500 players responded to the KIO
postcards that were sent out after the Spain
game calling for anti-racism Ambassadors
• England squad strips featured Kick It Out badges
for the high-profile England v. Holland game.
• The law has been changed so that any individual
spectator who makes a racist comment can be
arrested and banned from grounds.
• A protocol is now in place for players and match
officials to provide a guideline if a football match
is overshadowed by racism from the crowd.
Training
The PFA staff have received equality and diversity
training to ensure they have an understanding of the
issues. This is in line with current activity for all
football agencies. The PFA is working with Kick It
Out, FA Learning, the Premier League, the Football
League and the League Managers Association to
provide a training package for scholars, players,
managers and their staff. This has been agreed in
theory by all agencies and the first step is the
induction for scholars which has been implemented
into the MASE programme. It will be also be included
in the Football League scholarship programme from
the beginning of the 2006/07 season.
The training includes contributions from Steven
Gerrard, Rio Ferdinand, Ashley Cole, David James
and Ledley King discussing their thoughts on the role
that players have in the fight against racism.
All Agency Review
The Football Authorities formed the All Agency
Review Board in order to share information and best
practice on matters relating to equity and diversity.
The PFA continues to lead the way on these issues
and to ensure that its policies are implemented across
the board. The Commission for Racial Equality is
working closely with all agencies to ensure that its
Report for Racism in football’s findings and proposals
are adhered to. The CRE has appointed Garth Crooks
OBE and Paul Elliott as football advisors who are
working closely with the Department and all agencies.
PFA INITIATIVES
Black Coaches Forum
The Career Development of Black Players Forum
was launched by the PFA in 1993/94 to provide a
voice for players from the recent past to express
their frustrations about the lack of opportunities to
progress into coaching and management. The forum
continues to actively engage with all major
footballing bodies to address this inequity. The
group reports to the All Agency Review which
comprises the Football Association, the FA Premier
League, the Football League, the League Managers
Association and the Football Foundation who
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endorse the aims of the group. We seek to increase
the representation of BEM players by way of
lobbying, education and legislation.
The work of Paul Davis continues to bridge links with
black players taking coaching qualifications and
coach educator courses. He is working with a
number of high profile black players with regard to
their A Licence. Paul will continue this role whilst
assisting Paul Gascoigne as Assistant Manager at
Kettering Town FC.
The Prince’s Trust
The work that the Prince’s Trust carries out on behalf
of the PFA has become a significant success within
football clubs. The Trust has been briefed as to the
PFA objective to ensure that players are portrayed as
responsible and committed individuals with social
responsibility. The Prince’s Trust has reached over
75,000 young adults focusing on the hardest to
reach group which are often disillusioned with
society and ready to opt out of normal life. 
By working on the TEAM programme, in partnership
with football clubs and players, the young people
learn how to work in a group, aiming towards targets
with positive direction from their TEAM leaders and
footballers acting as role models. The football
initiative is a really positive lesson for all concerned
and highlights the positive role football can play in
enabling youngsters to achieve success.
Player Ambassadors for the Prince’s Trust include Rio
Ferdinand, Frank Lampard, Alan Smith, Dion Dublin
and Steven Taylor.
The National Literacy Trust
This campaign continues to use footballers to inspire
and motivate people to enjoy reading. This year the
PFA and the FA ran a new poster campaign that
demonstrated players from the England squad – Ashley
Cole, Alan Smith, Rio Ferdinand and David James –
reading books whilst in their England kit on the way to
games. The pictures were not staged and it is very
clear that the players have enjoyed some time-out by
reading a book. The posters have been distributed to
over 100,000 children and are displayed in schools,
colleges, libraries and book shops.
Oxfam
Oxfam has once again been chosen as our official
charity partner for season 2005/06. As of last year
we have agreed to support a Christmas appeal to our
members to raise money for educational projects. The
PFA has donated funds for a classroom to be built in
Africa and will be asking delegates to encourage their
team-mates to donate to this worthy cause. 
Tsunami Appeal
In May this year in partnership with the oil industry
and Chelsea FC, a football tournament and
fundraising dinner took place raising in excess of
£500,000 towards the Tsunami Relief Appeal. 
Teenage Cancer Trust
It should also be mentioned that Chelsea’s Frank
Lampard has raised over £1/2 million for the Teenage
Cancer Trust and this is just one example of one of our
prominent young players appreciating his position in
the game and using his profile to help others in need.
Children in Need
The PFA raised £16,000 for Children in Need by
donating a prize of a VIP package for two people to
attend the PFA Awards Dinner and a painting
commissioned by the PFA “My World United”.
David Beckham flew into London in November to
launch his new Football Academy next to the
Millennium Dome, his aim being not to make a profit
but to allow some 15,000 children a year to reap
some of the joy he has received from football. The
PFA sponsored a trip by England players, such as
Gary Neville and David James, in the summer to
Malawi to give support to an Aids Education
campaign and David has now set up a farming
project there. When I visited Soweto in South Africa
with FIFPro, I was able to witness the work of
Charlton Athletic in that deprived area and also see
evidence of Andy Cole’s charity work.
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Introduction
In 2003 I wrote an article for Soccer Review that
outlined the early findings of a research project that
my colleagues1 and I had just started for the Football
Foundation Community and Education (C&E) Panel.
Entitled Football and its Communities, the project is
a three-year study that has been designed to provide
the Football Foundation and the wider football
industry with a new vision and understanding of how
to engage with ‘communities’ of various types. The
project is now in its final stages, and the project
team is currently drawing up a final report which will
analyse the relationship between football clubs and
‘communities’; clarify who football’s communities
actually are; and debate the responsibilities that
football clubs have towards different groups.
In the 2003 edition of Soccer Review, I drew
attention to a number of early themes that were
emerging from the research. Amongst these was the
issue of how football clubs conceptualise and deliver
formal community programmes. The article pointed
out that many ‘traditional’ community programmes
are primarily concerned with promoting clubs to new
generations of supporters, and that as a result some
are as concerned (if not more so) with public
relations and commercial promotion as they are with
the well being of clubs’ communities. This theme has
been a constant source of discussion throughout our
research, and has led us to analyse the full range of
possible motivations that clubs can have when
undertaking community-focused schemes of work.
This article outlines a number of these themes, and
draws out a possible way forward which could
partially help clubs to overcome the inevitable
tensions that emerge when commercial organisations
are asked to deliver social intervention work.
A New Context for Football
When English football clubs first developed formal
‘football and community’ schemes in the 1970s and
1980s, the motivations for doing so were fairly clear.
The game was in a period of long decline, and
hooliganism had emerged as a sufficiently high-
profile social problem as to demand state
intervention. It is no surprise then that the first cross-
industry ‘Football and the Community’ scheme
launched by the then Sports Council in 1978 had
the following aims:
1. The acquisition of new facilities for clubs (in the
vast majority of cases).
2. Guidance, advice, facilities and finance to enable
greater club involvement with the local
community.
3. The discovery of talented young players who,
through transfer fees, could produce much-
needed finance for some clubs.
4. Increased attendances through better and more
frequent contact with the local community.
5. Reductions in football-related hooliganism and
violence by providing young fans with better
leadership and examples through organised and
controlled schemes.2
The most notable thing about these aims is the way
in which they centre on the needs of football clubs.
There may be implicit benefits for ‘communities’ in
what was proposed, but it is clear that the Sports
Council scheme was launched primarily in response
to football’s problems, rather than those of its
communities.
In the past 10 years, this situation has change
dramatically in at least two ways. Firstly, football, at
the top level at least, is now perceived to have less
industry-specific problems which might be addressed
by ‘community’ schemes, and, secondly, the British
government is increasingly interested in the ability of
sport in general, and football in particular, to tackle a
range of social problems. Indeed, since the election
of the Labour government in 1997 it has been
increasingly assumed that the ‘power’ and popularity
of football in the UK puts it in a unique position to
build and sustain communities, and that the game
can have positive influences on social and economic
regeneration, public health, educational standards,
community safety, crime reduction and the tackling
of social exclusion.
Mixed Motivations: Why Do Football
Clubs Do ‘Community’ Work?
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These changing contexts for English football have
produced a problem brought about by the fact that
many clubs’ attempts to engage with ‘new’ agendas
have largely been undertaken through their
community departments and traditional ‘football and
community’ approaches (often in association with
the national Football in the Community scheme).
This has meant that schemes and approaches which
were initially developed, partially at least, to ‘sell‘
football clubs to local communities, are now
increasingly being asked to engage in community
development work. From our research, we would
suggest that any true engagement with new social
agendas requires a step-change for English football
and the development of new motivations, skills and
training and methods of working.3
Football’s Response to New Agendas
Throughout our research we have encountered a
range of responses to the new expectations that have
been placed on football in terms of community
engagement and development. Some individuals
within the football industry have been resistant to the
‘community’ obligations that are now often placed on
the game and have argued that the increasingly
business-led nature of professional football should
effectively exempt clubs from onerous community or
social obligations. In more general terms, however,
English football has been willing to embrace and
promote its status as a community sport, and has
regularly made statements on the social good that it
can deliver. This is has been done in a variety of
contexts, including the UK courts and the European
Commission (in response to investigations into the FA
Premier League’s TV contract with BSkyB); the
annual reports of various football authorities and
clubs; and the media.
In order to live up to the expectations that the game
itself has increasingly helped to establish, our
research suggests that the English football authorities
and individual clubs need to better articulate the
reasons why they are engaging in community-focused
work. This is important because it will help to
establish a shared vision and a coherent
understanding of the game’s relationships with its
different communities and its obligations in
undertaking intervention-based work. Throughout our
research, we have encountered a range of
understandings in this area. Few of them, however,
have been expressed coherently and have often
appeared to be ‘after the event’ rationales, rather
than ‘up front’ strategies.
The different motivations that operate around the
game can loosely be split into three categories: ethical
motivations; business motivations and political/legal
motivations. Ethical motivations take a number of
different forms. They include the relatively simple
observation that professional football clubs in England
are with few exceptions named after places and,
therefore, may have a moral obligation to ‘give
something back’ (over and above football
entertainment) to the people who they claim to
represent. They also include statements on the
popularity which English football currently enjoys -
which cuts across class, gender, ‘race’, ethnicity, and
age - and the ‘power’ this potentially affords the game
to engage otherwise ‘hard-to-reach’ social groups.
Another ethical motivation which seems to inspire
government thinking in particular on the social role of
football is a ‘communitarian’ argument which argues
that football clubs have a potential role in building and
sustaining communities: a major concern for the
present government. Since 1997, the Blair
administration has been heavily influenced by a range
of communitarian thinkers when developing social
policies. Great emphasis has been placed on the
supposed utility of strong, inclusive communities and
their abilities to contribute to the tackling of social
problems. As football clubs are amongst the most
recognised symbols of ‘community identity’ in
contemporary Britain, the government and some
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individuals with English football have become
convinced that clubs have an important role to play in
building and sustaining communities of various types.
The business motivations that potentially underpin
football clubs’ community work again take a number
of forms. In line with wider business thinking on
community approaches and ‘stakeholder
management’, some in English football have
expressed to us their belief that community work can
help to produce short- or long-term business
benefits, or alternatively can help to avoid ‘business
risks’. Some recent research has shown that
engagement with ‘social’ or ‘community’ issues can
help businesses (such as football clubs) to develop
‘reputational advantages’ as people increasingly want
to be associated with ‘brands’ which express ‘good
qualities’ such as social and environmental
responsibility.4 Other research has shown that
businesses that are perceived to be trustworthy and
socially responsible are relatively protected from
sudden downturns in trade or hostile public criticism
when they perform poorly, or negatively affect the
lives of stakeholders in one way or another.5 This has
led some in English football to undertake community
work in order that their clubs can build up ‘good will
banks’ of positive feelings and experiences on which
different communities can draw when problems arise
on or off the pitch.
There are two other main business motivations for
undertaking community work that we have
encountered during the research. The first is based
on an awareness that the high levels of support
enjoyed by many English football clubs over the past
10 years cannot be taken for granted. Some
individuals in the English game are becoming
increasingly aware that attendances could fall
significantly if individual clubs and the game as a
whole does not now plan for the future and address
important industry ‘risks’. For some, new forms of
community engagement could help to achieve this
long-term sustainability. If English football clubs
consistently engage with stakeholder groups in a ‘just
and fair’ manner whilst also developing innovative
social programmes, the argument has been made to
us that they could become re-embedded into the
very fabric of different ‘communities’ across the
country. If they do not do this, it is suggested that
they could lose their relevance and be overtaken by
other forms of leisure.
The second motivation is based on new
understandings of what is now often termed
‘corporate citizenship’. In recent years, the long
academic debates that have developed around
corporate social responsibility (CSR) have been
slightly refocused to embrace a new sense of
obligation on businesses to be ‘good citizens’. It is in
this debate that ethical and business motivations for
companies such as football clubs to perform
community-focused roles have been brought together.
In classic CSR writings (and in early writings on
Corporate Citizenship), businesses such as football
clubs were regarded as hermeneutically sealed,
autonomous entities that operated outside of society.
This understanding allowed businesses to ‘engage
with society’ (society was ‘out there’) when it suited
them and on their own terms. They could meet
ethical responsibilities and develop community
programmes if they wished, but this was not
required of them because they were ‘separate from
society’. In more recent writings, this position has
been rejected as various writers have sought to
reposition businesses within the social realm. To
explain this, it is worth digressing into a more
theoretical debate for a moment.
The starting point for this repositioning has been to
re-analyse businesses as the equivalent of individual
citizens (like you and I) which have specific rights
and responsibilities. From an historical perspective,
business writers have discussed corporations’ fights
to obtain the rights of natural entities like people in
order that they could be entitled to the same
privileges as all other individuals and groups.6 This
fight resulted in corporations being awarded artificial,
legal ‘personalities’ under which they could trade.
These personalities were awarded in order that
corporations would be free from state interference,
but they did not guarantee that corporations would
necessarily have to meet set responsibility standards.
This is because the dominant liberal understanding
of citizenship, which has traditionally operated in
countries such as Britain, concentrates almost solely
on the rights of individuals (and by implication
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businesses).7 'These rights are defined as 'positive'
rights which are awarded by the state (such as the
right to health); 'negative' rights which are protected
by the state (such as freedom from undue
interference); and 'political' rights which encompass
activities such as the right to vote and the right to
engage in political lobbying. Whilst 'positive' rights
are not really applicable to businesses, private
companies continually campaign for 'negative'
protective rights, and regularly demonstrate their
right to engage in political lobbying through, for
instance, donations to political campaigns.'
Since the election of the New Labour government in
1997, the liberal understanding of citizenship has
been under attack in Britain as the state has
increasingly embraced a more communitarian
philosophy which asserts the rights and
responsibilities of individuals (and by implication
businesses) in the communities of which they are
members. From the corporate citizenship perspective,
this has meant that businesses such as football clubs
are no longer given a choice by many writers in
terms of whether they engage in community-focused
work or not. It is now often fundamentally required
of them as part of their responsibilities to the various
stakeholder groups into which they come into
contact. This means that for increasing numbers of
business writers private companies must have
effective policies which control and, where possible,
reduce the negative effects that they have on their
different communities’ (e.g. in terms of
environmental damage and other forms of
‘nuisance’), and must also contribute to the well-
being of communities through, for instance,
benevolent community policies and practices.
Whilst this debate has not been conducted in quite
these terms in English football, it is already having
an influence in terms of the expectations placed on
football clubs, especially by central government.
Since the 1980s, the government has advocated
increased partnership working in all areas of social
policy as a way of ensuring that the burden of work
is shared between the public, private and voluntary
sectors. This has meant convincing various elements
of the private sector, such as the football industry,
that they have roles to play in hosting, providing or
supporting services that traditionally would have
been the preserve of the state. This is where
communitarian-inspired theories on corporate
citizenship have proved useful. If it is accepted that
businesses have obligations to and responsibilities
for their communities, then it becomes very difficult
for them to reject requests from government to
become involved in the delivery of various social
policies. In the context of football, this increasing
culture of obligation and the need to be seen as a
‘good citizen’ has undoubtedly helped the
government to engage the football authorities and
clubs in a range of public-private partnerships,
including the Playing for Success education
initiative8 (run by the Department of Health in
partnership with the FA Premier League, the
Football League, the Football Foundation, local
education authorities and clubs) and the Football
and Health programme9 (developed by the
Department of Health in partnership with the
Football Association, the Professional Footballers’
Association, the FA Premier League, the Football
Foundation, the Department for Culture, Media and
Sport and Sport England).
These programmes and others highlight the ways in
which business motivations, inspired by new
communitarian ideas of what a private business is
and what it should deliver, have partly enabled the
government to convince English football of the wider
role it can play in delivering social and community
benefits. Its success in doing this should not be
overstated, however, as evidenced by the public row
which developed between Charles Clarke (the then
Education Secretary) and Ken Bates (the then
Chairman of Chelsea FC) in May 2003 over
Chelsea’s refusal to be involved in the Playing for
Success scheme.10 In this, Mr Bates was quoted as
stating that ‘gimmicks’ such as Playing for Success
would not be needed if the education system was not
in a ‘state of collapse’. Mr Clarke had earlier
criticised Chelsea by suggesting that the club had ‘an
obligation’ to support the scheme.
This debate brings us to the final set of motivations
that we have encountered during the research for
undertaking community work in English football:
political/legal motivations. As English football is
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currently engaged in a range of formal and informal
partnerships with government, some individuals within
the football industry pointed out to us the political
expediency of carrying out this work, particularly in
terms of the football industry maintaining government
support in a range of areas. The most important of
these in recent years has undoubtedly been with
regard to the collective selling of television rights,
which was first challenged by the Restrictive Practices
Count (RPC) in England in 1999 and continues to be
contested at a European level to this day. In these
cases and others, English football has argued for
exemptions from certain aspects of national and
European law on the basis that existing arrangements
are of public benefit. Given ongoing concern over the
regulation of football, some within the football industry
have suggested to us that English football needs to
continue and further develop its support for
community work in order to maintain current
regulatory and business practices around the game.
A Possible Way Forward
Through our research we have discovered that the
motivations outlined above are all currently rehearsed
to varying extents within English football as rationales
for undertaking community-focused work. The vital
point to note, however, is that many of them are
radically opposed to one another and will lead English
football in general and clubs in particular in very
different directions in terms of how they understand
their community obligations, how they design
programmes of work, and what returns (if any) they
expect to get from such work. Put in its most simple
terms, ethical motivations focus on clubs’ obligations to
their communities and put the needs of communities at
the forefront. Business and political/legal motivations
focus largely on business practices for football clubs
and put the needs of clubs at the forefront.
It is probably too demanding a task to design a
single set of coherent motivations which can
underpin English football’s future approaches to
undertaking community engagement and
development work. The industry is simply too large
and contains too many disparate elements to share
in a single understanding of why it should support
community initiatives. What is clear, however, is that
different motivations lead to different expectations for
clubs and communities, and sometimes to conflicting
schemes of work. This issue needs to be strategically
managed if English football’s approach to community
issues is not to be misinterpreted. Current
community initiatives operating around the game run
the risk of being criticised as commercially
exploitative if the rationales behind those initiatives
are not more clearly articulated and understood.
At club level we have begun investigating a range of
options that might help clubs to separate those
elements of their community work that are inspired
primarily by the needs of communities, and those that
are not. One of the possibilities we have considered is
the creation of independent community
departments/organisations at football clubs. In recent
years, a number of community departments have
developed independence from their host clubs, most
frequently by adopting charitable status. Whilst the
advantages and disadvantages of charitable status are
open to debate, we accept that organisational and
financial separation between clubs and their
community departments might be beneficial, especially
when those departments are responsible for community
intervention work in areas such as health, education,
community safety, crime reduction and regeneration.
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From our research, there appear to be a number of
potential benefits of adopting such a strategy. The
most immediate of these is the fact that
independence for community departments will
enable clubs to overcome some of the tensions
between ‘commercial’ and ‘community’ motivations
in their work. If community departments at clubs
have little organisational or financial independence,
their work will usually be tied to the commercial
objectives of the club. Independent community
departments/organisations will be able to establish
their own institutional aims that are tied less to
commercial objectives, as long as their
independence is both financial and organisational.
This could be vital if such departments/organisations
are to successfully deliver programmes that are
designed primarily to meet the multiple needs of
different communities, rather than the direct needs
of football clubs.
Independence could also help community
departments to establish credibility with potential
local partner agencies. Some of the charitable trusts
which have been establish in football in recent years
have embraced new, inclusive cultures of working
and have involved various people from their different
communities as trustees, steering group members
and volunteers. This has enabled them to develop
reputations as credible local agencies that are truly
concerned with various communities’ needs.
There are, of course, some benefits for clubs
themselves in terms of establishing independent
community departments/organisations. In adopting
this strategy, clubs will no longer have to take direct
responsibility for some areas of community work that
by their very nature are commercially fragile and
politically sensitive. They will also be able to accrue
positive publicity from the activities of independent
organisations, as long as they have retained nominal
links with clubs. Importantly, though, any PR
benefits which do develop for clubs from the work of
independent departments will be incidental and
indirect. It will not be a prime motive for undertaking
community development and engagement work.
The re-structuring of community departments in this
way is just one option we are considering to help
bring clarity to the sometimes confused motivations
for undertaking community work which currently
operate around English football. There are other,
potentially complementary strategies which will also
need to be considered at clubs if all their areas of
work are to start operating in more community-
focused ways: something they will have to embrace
if they are to adopt more ‘holistic’ approaches to
community development and engagement. We will
fully address these issues and more in our research
final report for the Football Foundation C&E Panel,
which is due to published in early 2006.
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Stephen Morrow
On September 10 1985 one of Scotland’s most
talented football managers, Jock Stein, first British
manager to lift the European Cup, dropped dead as
he rose from the dugout at Ninian Park, Cardiff,
seconds after guiding Scotland to their fourth
appearance in the World Cup Finals. Twenty years
later Scotland has failed to qualify for the 2006
World Cup Finals to be held in Germany; the fourth
consecutive major tournament in a decade that it has
failed to qualify for. In the twelve years since the
advent of the FIFA world ranking for national sides,
Scotland’s ranking has dropped from 28 to 74, the
country’s lowest ever ranking.
When will we see your like again?
Where did it all go wrong? Some, like the former
Scotland manager, Craig Brown, have argued that the
present period of lack of success is cyclical; others
are less convinced and see it as an example of
systemic failure. 
Certainly, there are many factors that have contributed
to the decay in Scottish football. Some, like the
changing economics of football in Europe and the
liberalising of the player market post-Bosman, have
been beyond any one country’s control. But their
impact on football in Scotland has been marked as
clubs invested heavily in overseas players in the hope
of remaining competitive within the Scottish game
and/or becoming competitive in Europe. One
inevitable consequence of the influx of overseas
players into Scottish football has been the reduction in
first team opportunities for young Scottish players.
Nowhere has this been this more apparent than at the
Old Firm clubs. The respected Scottish journalist and
broadcaster, Bob Crampsey, observed that while in the
past non-Old Firm fans used to comfort themselves
with the thought that at least a strong Rangers and
Celtic meant a strong Scotland, in the post-Bosman
world of Scottish football, a strong Rangers and Celtic
meant only a strong Rangers and Celtic1. Of just as
much concern is the fact that Scottish players have
not found themselves in major demand in other
leagues. This is underlined when considering the
quantity and quality of Scottish players south of the
border. When the World Cup was last played in
Germany in 1974, Scotland’s squad contained twelve
players from major English clubs, including 5 from the
1973/74 champions, Leeds United (Billy Bremner,
David Harvey, Peter Lorimer, Joe Jordan and Gordon
McQueen). Of the 10 English-based players selected
by Walter Smith for the final two matches in the
qualifying competition for the 2006 World Cup games
against Belarus and Slovenia, 5 play for clubs outside
the FA Premiership, while of those playing with
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Premiership clubs – Steven Caldwell, Sunderland;
Christian Dailly, West Ham United; Darren Fletcher,
Manchester United; James McFadden, Everton; David
Weir, Everton – not all could be considered regular
first team players. Twenty years after Jock Stein’s
death Scotland’s anguish follows the same cycle
endured by Wales; namely a continuing failure to
reach the finals of major tournaments.
Looking behind results and players, it is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that there has been
complacency inside the Scottish Football Association,
the body charged with running the game in Scotland.
This has resulted in poor and/or non-existent policy
making over a number of years in areas like youth
development initiatives and developing a high quality
sporting infrastructure. But, while the Scottish
tabloid press considers it fair to continue to point the
finger of blame at the Scottish Football Association,
or, more particularly at this juncture, at its present
Chief Executive, David Taylor – ‘It’s too late to own
up Taylor ... Just go’2; ‘Quit now David’3 - what is
required is not yet another round of the blame game
but rather a reasoned analysis of what is being done
and what more might be done to put Scottish
football back on track.
In June 2002, the consultants PMP were appointed
to review the structure and development systems of
youth football in Scotland. Importantly, the review
looked holistically at youth football, considering
issues as diverse as strategy, player pathways,
funding and facilities4. In 2004 the Scottish
Executive announced that it would provide financial
support to the value of £1.2m per annum for the
‘Many Players – One Goal’ action plan for youth
development arising out of the review. The SFA’s
promise to ‘assume an active role in leading the
development of youth football in Scotland’ was a
very welcome, if, critics might say, overdue statement
of intent5. Clearly there is a need for the SFA, and by
extension, its Chief Executive to lead the changes in
football and to manage the process of change.
Moreover the major challenge now is to ensure that
this action plan delivers, and it is important that
systems are developed to ensure there is appropriate
monitoring and evaluation of the initiative and to
achieve public accountability. 
In 2004 it was announced that the Scottish
Executive and ‘Sportscotland’ were to provide funding
of £51m for new sports facilities network6. This
announcement was warmly welcomed by many
football stakeholders, given that the facilities include
five full size indoor football training pitches; the first
of their kind in Scotland. By contrast such facilities
were available in a country like Norway more than
twenty years ago. Nevertheless it remains the case
that there is also a need for better quality local
facilities, particularly all-weather surfaces.
Organisations and individuals spoken to during the
Scottish Parliament’s Enterprise and Culture
Committee’s investigation into the need for the
reform of Scottish football, considered that a lack of
adequate facilities at grassroots or local level was
perhaps the most important issue affecting the
development of football in Scotland7. 
At the professional end of the game, another factor that
can facilitate an improvement in Scotland’s football is a
competitive league. Much of Europe is witnessing
increasingly uncompetitive leagues and more
concentrated success. Nowhere is this more apparent
than in England where Chelsea had established a firm
lead in the Premier League within two months of the
start of the season. Paradoxically in Scotland, the
country with the most dominated domestic league in
Western Europe - since its inception in 1975/76, the
Premier League, subsequently the Scottish Premier
League, has been won by either Celtic or Rangers in
26 out of 30 seasons – at this stage of the season
there is genuine evidence of uncertainty of outcome as
to which club will be the 2005/06 SPL champions.
This relates partly to the rise of Heart of Midlothian
and Hibernian and partly to the poor run of domestic
form by Rangers. Leaving aside the excitement this less
predictable season is generating for spectators and
television companies, it is also surely beneficial for the
players to be taking part in more competitive games
during the season. Moreover, it is particularly
heartening to find Scottish players playing regularly for
the clubs at the top end of the Scottish Premier League
table. This is illustrated in Table1 which sets out the
players from these four clubs who have been involved
in the four Scottish international matches so far in
season 2005/06 (until the end of October). 
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Table 1
Club Player (age) International appearances Unused substitute
season 2005/06 
Celtic Craig Beattie (21) v. Italy, Norway v. Slovenia
Shaun Maloney (22) v. Belarus v. Slovenia
Heart of Craig Gordon (22) v. Italy, Norway, -
Midlothian Belarus, Slovenia
Paul Hartley (29) v. Italy, Norway, -
Belarus, Slovenia
Andy Webster (23) v. Italy, Norway, v. Belarus
Slovenia
Steven Pressley (32) v. Norway, Belarus, -
Slovenia 
Hibernian Gary Caldwell (23) v. Slovenia v. Belarus
Gary O’Connor (22) v. Slovenia v. Belarus
Rangers Barry Ferguson (27) v. Italy, Norway, -
Belarus
Ian Murray (24) v. Belarus v. Italy, Norway
Steven Thompson (27) - v. Norway
Notwithstanding the despondency that surrounded
Scotland’s failure to qualify for the 2006 World Cup
finals, at last there is some evidence relating both
to short term results on the field and longer term
developments that things are starting to get better.
Let’s hope that the Everton and Scotland defender,
David Weir, is correct in his summing up of the
situation after Scotland’s 3-0 victory in Slovenia:
‘Now we can look forward with optimism. Not
being silly about it, but we can start having a little
bit of hope’8.
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Roger Penn 
Since 1990 there has been a dramatic transformation
in English Premier League stadia. As a result of the
Taylor Report (1990), English stadia were rebuilt to
incorporate high levels of safety1. A central element in
this was the requirement that all spectators had to sit
rather than stand during matches. The new stadia are
impressive sights. In the North West region of England
(the historic heartland of the professional game)
Blackburn Rovers (see Photograph 1) and Bolton
Wanderers (see Photograph 2) have replaced their
geriatric stands with ultra-modern, visually dramatic
new constructions. Manchester United have rebuilt
three sides of Old Trafford to produce England’s largest
current football stadium with 67,800 seats.
Sunderland FC has built a new stadium holding
around 50,000 spectators (see Photograph 3).
Manchester City moved from Maine Road – an old
stadium blighted by poor sight-lines – to the
Commonwealth Stadium (now renamed the City of
Manchester Stadium) in 2003. These new stadia are
amongst the architectural wonders of the age2. Indeed,
The City of Manchester Stadium featured prominently
amongst the iconic buildings catalogued in the
monumental Phaidon Atlas of Contemporary World
Architecture3. These new stadia also feature in a
range of recent studies of sports architecture4. When
the organisers of Euro 2008 – which is to be held in
Austria and Switzerland  - came to England to
examine architectural best practice, it was to the
stadia in Manchester and Bolton that they headed.
The aim here is to examine two features of these new
Premium League stadia. The first is the extent to which
the new stadia physically embody powerful emotions
within their structures. These affective aspects
simultaneously foster connections with the longer
histories of these clubs, connections that sometimes
link the new stadia to the old abandoned grounds
elsewhere. Such links are significant in that they
continue to have powerful resonance for both home and
visiting supporters. Indeed, they are central to the
emergence of new forms of spectator behaviour within
these stadia. Related to these developments is a second
feature, the absence of graffiti on these stadia. This
point will be pursued through a comparison with the
graffiti-covered stadia in Serie A in Italy.
The new stadia physically embody a range of powerful
emotions. This is epitomised by the memorial to the
1946 Burnden Park disaster that has recently been
constructed at Bolton Wanderers’ new ground, the
Reebok Stadium (see Photograph 4).  This disaster
happened on the occasion of an FA Cup match
between Bolton and Stoke City. It involved an over-
capacity crowd and the collapse of two barriers and
led to the death of 33 spectators5. The Memorial
contains a book of remembrance with the names of all
those who perished, the pages of which are turned
regularly in a manner akin to similar books in
churches that commemorate those who fell in the two
World Wars of the twentieth century. Within the
Memorial – which is situated to the side of the
stadium, close to the main entrance – is an eternal
flame which ensures that the book is visible day and
night. Once again this parallels similar flames in
cemeteries. Manchester United also have a memorial
to the Munich Air Disaster in 1958 (see Photograph
5).  This involves a plaque shaped like the old
stadium with a pitch marked out in grey and white.
The names of the players and officials of the club who
died in this tragedy are etched on the pitch. The
plaque was originally situated on the pre-1990
stadium but, following renovations, it was moved to a
prominent position on the East Stand in the mid-
1990s. Just around the corner, on the old South Stand
(the only stand not to have been rebuilt during the
1990s) stands the Munich clock which simply reads
‘February 6th 1958 Munich’, the date of the disaster
(see Photograph 6).  On the front of the new East
Stand stands a statue to Sir Matt Busby, the manager
seriously injured at Munich who returned to
successfully manage the team to the Holy Grail of the
European Cup in 1968 (see Photograph 7). A number
of the new stadia have statues often commemorating
talismanic players of yesteryear. These include 'Dixie'
Dean at Everton’s Goodison Park (see Photograph 8),
Wilf Mannion and George Hardwick at Middlesborough
(see Photographs 9 and 10), Stanley Matthews at
Stoke City (see Photograph 11), Tom Finney at Preston
North End (see Photograph 12), Jackie Milburn at St
James’s Park, Newcastle, and Billy Bremner at Leeds.
These statues are not only of famous players. At
Liverpool, the main statue is of Bill Shankly – the
manager who created the modern successful team –
Cathedrals of Sport: football stadia in
contemporary England
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and the inscription beneath simply reads 'He made the
people happy' (see Photograph 13).  Anfield also
displays a plaque of Bob Paisley, Shankley’s assistant,
who subsequently led the club to a succession of
European Cup victories in the late 1970s and early
1980s (see Photograph 14). Blackburn Rovers have
erected a statue to the late Jack Walker, their
millionaire owner who funded both the new stadium
and the team that won the Premier League in 1995
(see Photograph 15).  The cost of this statue was
borne, not by the club, but by its supporters. It
features Walker with arms outstretched, wearing a
Rovers’ scarf with the inscription 'Rovers Greatest
Supporter'.  Next to the statue is a commemorative
garden with a poem on a stone wall situated behind
the shrubs (see Photograph 16).  This has become a
sacred space for Blackburn fans. Soon after the
erection of the statue, families established new
‘tradition’ of taking one bunch of flowers from the
funeral cortege of a deceased Rovers’ fan and laying it
in homage at the feet of the statue (see Photograph
17).  Clearly, he made a powerful impact on local
fans. Indeed, immediately after Blackburn’s League
Cup victory over Tottenham at the Millenium Stadium
in 2002 Blackburn fans chorused with the song
‘There’s only one Jack Walker’ as a tribute to their
deceased owner. Perhaps the most unusual and the
most prominent statue is to be found outside
Sunderland’s Stadium of Light. Here is a statue to the
fans themselves: a man, a woman and two children
(see Photograph 18).  The inscription below the statue
is the most detailed and poignant. It reads:
'All generations come together at the Stadium
of Light. A love of "The Lads" has bonded
together supporters for more than 125 years
and will for many more years in the future. At
Sunderland it is this statue to the fans that
has pride of place. Supporters who have
passed away have their support carried on by
today's fans, just as the supporters of today
will have their support continued through
families and friends. We share this vision and
bond as one because Sunderland AFC is For
Us All' (see Photograph 19).
Outside some of the new stadia are commemorative
brick walkways. The one at Bolton features grey
square slabs with gold inlaid lettering that feature
inscriptions remembering deceased Wanderers' fans
(see Photograph 20).  These are adjacent to
rectangular red bricks with lettering in gold that list
various supporters. At Old Trafford the walkway
features red brick with the names of supporters in
blue-grey amidst bricks with gold letters that name
famous United players of yesteryear (see Photograph
21).  These walkways bear testimony to the
importance of the respective clubs to their supporters
and the need to commemorate this allegiance within
the space of the stadia themselves. At Bolton's new
Reebok Stadium, a series of banners and flags from
the former Burnden Park ground have been hung in
the foyer of the club's museum (see Photograph 22).
What is the significance of these physical features at
the new stadia? They indicate that each new stadium
is a sacred space. They give strong emotional
attachment to 'home' that characterizes modern sport6.
These stadia also constitute memorials to the dead.
Famous players, managers and even owners are
remembered both by statues and commemorative
walkways. They are also places where ordinary fans
are remembered. In a very real sense the stadia
transcend mortality. In their scale and aesthetic
grandeur these stadia express both past glories and
future hopes. The new Premier League stadia are sites
of enormous local pride. Indeed, in towns like
Blackburn, Bolton and Sunderland, the new stadia are
the most important new architectural sites since 1945.
They act as tourist attractions: large numbers come to
eat, drink (see Photographs 23 and 24), shop (see
Photograph 25) and visit museums (see Photograph
26) and take tours of the stadia themselves. Many
simply come to look. Many opposition fans also
respect and admire the new stadia, often arriving early
to wander around and to shop in club stores.
The fact that there is no graffiti on the new Premier
League stadia contrasts dramatically with the
municipally owned communal stadia in Italy's Serie A
(see Photographs 27 and 28).  Paradoxically, some
of the Italian graffiti draws upon English hooligan
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templates seemingly in an attempt to plug into the
widespread myth about English football that
continues to pervade current Italian fan culture (see
Photographs 29 and 30).  Italian stadia are covered
in graffiti some of which is explicitly political (see
Photograph 31).  This feeds upon the longstanding
politicisation of Italian football and Italian stadia that
have its roots in nation-building aspirations of
Mussolini7 (see Photograph 32).  These roots are still
strikingly apparent outside the Stadio Olimpico in
Rome, home to AS Roma and Lazio, where an
obelisk to 'Mussolini Dux' stands at the entrance to
the long avenue from the banks of the Tevere to the
stadium itself (see Photograph 33).  This avenue has
a colonnade of carved stones that are some 3 feet
high, 5 feet wide and 1 foot in depth. They are
embellished by a series of Fascist-inspired nationalist
slogans (see Photographs 34 and 35).  The walkway
itself has a series of explicitly warlike messages
etched into its structure (see Photograph 36).
Notwithstanding the fact that Bologna has been a
city dominated by the Italian Communist Party, its
Renato Dall'Ara stadium (see Photograph 37), still
has fascist eagles on the main gates (see Photograph
38) and within the entrance to the modernist tower
(see Photograph 39) where a bronze statue of
Mussolini's used to stand8. The politicisation of
Italian stadia has been a powerful influence in
accounting for the persistence of graffiti. Major Italian
cities are also covered in graffiti, much of it political
in nature (see Photographs 40, 41 and 42).  Indeed,
a great deal of the imagery remains tied to the
intense political polarization that characterised Italian
society in the period 1943 to 1948. The battle
between left and right, particularly between
Communists and neo-Fascists finds visual expression
in many Italian urban settings.9 Graffiti in football
stadia is but another manifestation of this pattern
(see Photograph 43).
The fact that English stadia remain graffiti-free seems
to demonstrate the power of the stadia and, in
particular, the extent to which they have been
successful in embodying popular emotions. The new
stadia have become sacred spaces. There seems little
doubt that the success in combating hooliganism is
more than a matter of seated stadia and CCTV. A vital
element is the positive emotional affectivity generated
by the physicality of the new stadia themselves. It is in
this sense that we can talk of 'Cathedrals of Sport'.
The new English Premier League stadia inspire awe
and express transcendent values. The intimate
architectural details enshrined within these stadia
simultaneously embody popular emotions and act as a
powerful mechanism of control over such emotions.
Photographs
1. Aerial shot of Ewood Park, Blackburn Rovers.
2. Reebok Stadium, Bolton Wanderers.
3. The Stadium of Light, Sunderland.
4. Memorial to the Burnden Park Disaster 1946 at the Reebok
Stadium, Bolton.
5. Munich Memorial, Old Trafford, Manchester United.
6. Munich Clock, Old Trafford, Manchester United.
7. Statue of Sir Matt Busby, Old Trafford, Manchester United.
8. Statue of 'Dixie' Dean, Goodison Park, Everton.
9. Statue of Wilf Mannion, Riverside Stadium, Middlesbrough.
10. Statue of George Hardwick, Riverside Stadium, Middlesbrough.
11. Statue of Sir Stanley Matthews, Britannia Stadium, Stoke City.
12. Statue of Tom Finney, Deepdale, Preston North End.
13. Statue of Bill Shankley, Anfield, Liverpool.
14. Paisley Gateway, Anfield, Liverpool.
15. Jack Walker Statue, Ewood Park, Blackburn Rovers.
16. Jack Walker Memorial Garden, Ewood Park, Blackburn Rovers.
17. Flowers at the Base of Jack Walker's Statue, Ewood Park,
Blackburn Rovers.
18. Statue of Fans, The Stadium of Light, Sunderland.
19. Inscription on Statue, The Stadium of Light, Sunderland.
20. Memorial Brick Walkway, Reebok Stadium, Bolton Wanderers.
21. Memorial Brick Walkway, Old Trafford, Manchester United.
22. Old Banner, Reebok Stadium, Bolton Wanderers.
23. Lion of Vienna Bar, Reebok Stadium, Bolton Wanderers.
24. Blue Café, Ewood Park, Blackburn Rovers.
25. Inside Mega Store, Old Trafford, Manchester United.
26. Entrance to Manchester United Museum, Old Trafford.
27. Graffiti inside Bologna Stadium.
28. Graffiti inside Fiorentina Stadium.
29. Graffiti outside Fiorentina Stadium.
30. Graffiti inside Bologna Stadium 2.
31. Graffiti Bologna Stadium Seating.
32. Bologna Stadium Architecture.
33. Obelisk to Mussolini, Stadio Olimpico, Roma.
34. Walkway to Stadio Olimpico, Roma.
35. Fascist Inscription, Walkway to Stadio Olimpico, Roma.
36. Fascist Message, Walkway, Roma.
37. Mussolini Statue in Bologna Stadium during 1930s.
38. Fascist Eagle on Gate, Bologna Stadium.
39. Fascist Eagle on Tower, Bologna Stadium.
40. Graffiti, Central Rome 1.
41. Graffiti, Central Rome 2.
42. Graffiti, Central Rome 3.
43. Graffiti, Stadio Olimpico, Roma
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Football Spectators in English and
Italian Stadia
Roger Penn
In its examination of the behaviour of football
spectators in England and Italy, this article makes
central use of photographic evidence from football
matches in both countries. Such a method is both
innovative and based upon wider traditions of
observational research1. The recent advent of digital
camera technology has encouraged a burgeoning use
of visual data as evidence. This approach is
particularly appropriate for an understanding of
differences between spectators in English and Italian
football stadia, since both the game and spectatorship
are central elements involved in the spectacle that is
modern football2. The evidence was collected mainly
by the author at a range of matches in England and
Italy over recent years. These photographic data
formed part of a wider comparative approach to
football in England and Italy3. None of them were
staged: all were taken 'in situ' as matches unfolded.
They are presented both as illustrative of much wider
structures and, in the view of the author, they can be
seen as typical of patterns of behaviour at major
football matches in the two countries.
Behaviour of fans in English and Italia football stadia
is radically different. Nowadays the main complaints
voiced by fans in England about the live football
experience are the price of tickets and the lack of
‘atmosphere’ in the new stadia rather than the
activities of other fans4. This represents a major
change since the dark days of hooliganism in the
1970s and 1980s. The alleged passivity of
contemporary English crowds is something of a myth,
one that certainly could not be said to have
characterised the recent important Champions’ League
fixtures at Old Trafford or Anfield. People also tend to
forget the funereal atmosphere at Old Trafford in the
late 1980s before the advent of the all-seater stadium
there!  Atmosphere is certainly not lacking in Italian
stadia and nor is there any shortage of major problems
with sections of the fans. The present paper attempts
to identify and explain this variation in the forms taken
by fan behaviour in the two countries.
The first and most powerful factor lies in the stadia
themselves. English stadia are owned by the clubs
themselves. Since the Taylor Report5 a new
generation of all-seated stadia have been built in
England (see Photographs 1 and 2). Spectators must
sit (see Photograph 3): those who stand can be
ejected and banned from the stadium, although the
latter sanction is rarely used. The majority of home
supporters are season-ticket holders, whilst most of
the other ticket holders have a known identity as a
result of membership schemes and/or credit card
sales. Almost all away fans are also season-ticket
holders. At Old Trafford, for example, 3,000 away
tickets are sent to the visiting club’s ground for sale.
First refusal goes to their season-ticket holders who
can often number over 20,000. Few tickets go on
sale beyond this select and identifiable band.
The clubs in England are responsible for the safety of
spectators. Their safety is secured by means of a
dual strategy of stewarding (see Photographs 4 and
5) and co-operative policing (see Photographs 6 and
7). The stewards, employed by the club, surround
the perimeter of the pitch (see Photograph 8) and
guide spectators to their seats within the stadium.
They are responsible for compliance with the laws
and rules that govern spectatorship. The police only
intervene when requested by the stewards or when
fighting erupts. This is very infrequent within stadia
today. Inside the stadium police and stewards
cooperate to control the crowd (see Photographs 9
and 10). Outside stadia the police are present but
there is no longer a strategy of segregating fans and
they routinely mix outside the ground both before
and after the match. The police on occasions search
away fans but rarely (never in my experience) home
fans. The central aim of policing at English stadia is
to defuse problems and avoid set-piece battles
between fans or between fans and the police.
The situation in Serie A is very different. The clubs
do not own their own stadia and tickets are sold with
few, if any, controls. At the 'derby' match between
Bologna and Fiorentina in April 2005 it was possible
to buy a ticket for the home ‘curva’ 30 minutes
before kick-off and enter the away ‘curva’, despite
searches and ticket inspection by the ‘carabinieri’
(see Photographs 11 and 12).  There is little
stewarding within Italian stadia (see Photograph 13).
The fans are ‘autonomous’ and anonymous (see
Photograph 14).  Indeed, they can approach and
32
SOCCER REVIEW 2005 - facilitated by the Professional Footballers Association
enter the stadium with hoods up and scarves across
their faces. They can also bring enormous banners
(see Photograph 15) and megaphones, (see
Photograph 16), into the stadia in order to facilitate
orchestration of their section of the crowd. Recently,
it has been stipulated that the banners must have
‘bendy’ poles, because rigid ones had been used
both as spears and for vaulting across the moat that
envelopes the perimeter of most of the Italian
grounds. Spectators rarely sit down during play (see
Photographs 17 and 18).
Away fans in Italy are segregated in a cage with
plastic sides at least 40 feet high (see Photographs
19 and 20).  The front of the cage has steel bars to
contain the fans (see Photograph 21) and the plastic
is generally covered in graffiti (see Photograph 22),
as are the concourses and seating areas (see
Photographs 23, 24, 25 and 26).
The carabinieri are prepared for a worst-case
scenario. They arrive in enormous numbers, heavily
protected in full riot gear (see Photograph 27).
Before the match they block streets (see Photograph
28), search all spectators and, in general, inject a
strong element of intimidation into the match-day
spectacle (see Photographs 29 and 30).  At the
slightest hint of trouble they line up with their shields
(see Photograph 31) and batons and, if deployed,
cudgel any fans that cross their path. Any
deterioration in the situation presages the
deployment of tear gas and water canon.
Much of the ritualised conflict in and around Italian
stadia seems aimed more at the police rather than
opposition fans. Indeed, the very structure of the day
seems more like a carnival of political contestation
than a sporting occasion. In April 2005 most of the
banners in the home ‘curva’ for the Bologna versus
Fiorentina match were advocating legalizing cannabis
rather than indicating either support for the Bologna
team or hostility to their close rivals from Florence.
Football matches in Italy seem to be about much
more than football – political and regional
animosities are integral to the chanting, the ritualised
insults and the physical battle that simmer amongst
the fans, particularly the ‘ultras’ situated behind each
of the goals.
Summary and Conclusion
Clearly there are major differences in the organization
of football matches between England and Italy that
have a significant impact upon crowd behaviour.
Since the early 1990s the English Premier League
has adopted a policy of all-seated stadia that are
stewarded by the clubs themselves. The police in
England hold themselves in reserve to support the
stewards and adopt a conciliatory and relatively
passive role. Spectators tend to be known to the
stewards because of the overwhelming
preponderance of season-ticket holders attending
Premier League matches. The situation in Italy is
distinctively different. Italian football matches have a
strong flavour of carnival and transgression whereas
games in the English Premier League are more akin
to opera or theatre. Each country has its own set of
cultural assumptions and these find expression in
very different kinds of crowd behaviour. Given
England’s reputation for football crowd disorder, the
reaction of the Italian sporting press to crowd
problems in Italy in the spring of 2005 was infused
with more than an element of irony. The English
'model' was held up as a positive example for Italian
football. This surely testifies to the distance that
English football has travelled since the dark days of
the 1980s and also helps to demonstrate the
contingent and mutable nature of spectator behaviour
in the contemporary era.
Photographs
1. The Stadium of Light, Sunderland.
2. Reebok Stadium, Bolton Wanderers.
3. Deepdale, Preston North End vs. Millwall 2004, All Seated.
4. Stewarding at Sunderland vs. Watford, 2005.
5. Stewarding at Ewood Park, Blackburn Rovers vs. Tottenham
Hotspur, 2004.
6. Policing at the Stadium of Light, Sunderland 2005.
7. Policing for Preston North End vs. Millwall, Deepdale, 2004.
8. Ewood Park, Balckburn Rovers vs. Tottenham Hotspur, Stewards
React to a Spurs goal.
9. Policing inside the Stadium of Light, Sunderland vs. Watford,
2005.
10. Police and Stewards at Deepdale for Preston North End vs.
Millwall.
11. Sarah searched at Bologna, 2005.
12. Entry to Bologna Stadium, 2005.
13. No Stewards at Fiorentina, 2004.
14. Crowd Autonomy at Fiorentina, 2004.
15. Banners at Bologna vs. Fiorentina, 2005.
16. Orchestrating the Fans, Bologna vs. Fiorentina, 2005.
33
SOCCER REVIEW 2005 - facilitated by the Professional Footballers Association
continued…
17. Tutti a Piedi at Bologna vs. Fiorentina, 2005.
18. Bologna fans standing at Bologna vs. Reggina, 2003.
19. Fiorentina vs. Sampdoria 2004: The Cage.
20. Fiorentina fans abuse Sampdoria fans after Sampdoria score the
first goal, 2004.
21. Front of Cage at Bologna, 2005.
22. Graffiti in front of the Cage at Bologna, 2003.
23. Graffiti, Bologna seating, 2005.
24. Recent Graffiti, Bologna stadium, 2005.
25. Ancient Graffiti, Bologna stadium, 2004.
26. Carabinieri at Fiorentina stadium, 2004.
27. Carabinieri at Bologna, 2003.
28. Carabinieri block street outside Bologna stadium, 2005.
29. Fiorentina, Carabinieri Post Match, 2004.
30. Carabinieri, Fiorentina vs. Sampdoria, 2004.
31. Riot Police in Line at Bologna, 2003.
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Seamus Kelly and Ivan Waddington
Introduction
In an edition of Singer and Friedlander, Perry noted
that, given the widespread interest in the football
manager, ‘it is strange that so little is really
understood about him and his contemporary role’.1
It is certainly the case that the literature on the
professional football club manager, though growing,
remains rather limited. In editions of Singer and
Friedlander and Soccer Review, Carter has outlined
the historical origins of football management and has
provided a broad historical overview of the
development of the role of the modern manager from
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2
Other studies of football management have focused
on mangers’ job roles and shared beliefs, coaching
efficiency, team performance and managerial change. 
Useful though these studies are, none of them focus
directly on what is arguably the key relationship in
football clubs: the relationship between managers
and players. In particular, little is known about how
relationships between club managers and players are
managed on a day-to-day basis. The central focus of
this paper is on the relationship between managers
and players in relation to the development and
imposition of club discipline. 
The study reported here was based on interviews
with players and managers who were either currently,
or who had previously been, employed as
professionals within the league structure in England
and/or Ireland. Twenty-two players and seventeen
managers were interviewed during the 2004-05
season. The playing and/or managing careers of those
interviewed lay between the extremes of outstanding
professional success and more modest success. Some
of the interviewees had played or managed at
international level, while others had spent their entire
careers in the lower leagues. More specifically, of the
twenty-two players who were interviewed, sixteen
had had experience as full-time professionals with
clubs in the English Premier League. At the time of
the interviews, seven were playing as full-time
professionals with English league clubs while the
remaining fifteen were playing as full-time
professionals with clubs in the Eircom Premier
League in Ireland. Nine players had played at
international level, two at full international level and
seven at Under-21 level. The players’ ages ranged
from 21- 31. Of the seventeen managers who were
interviewed, eight had managed clubs in England and
three of these were currently managing English clubs.
The remainder had all managed professional clubs in
the Eircom Premier League. Several interviewees had
managed clubs in both England and Ireland. One
interviewee had managed a national side.
Establishing Rules of Conduct
It is important to recognise that, although there are
some common themes that are found in most clubs,
club rules are also characterised by important
arbitrary elements. Club rules are normally drawn up
and imposed on players by the manager without any
discussion with the players. Thus both the rules and
the ways in which they are enforced, are left almost
entirely to the discretion – or the whim – of the
manager and therefore reflect, to some extent, each
manager’s preferences, experiences and ‘pet hates’.
As a consequence, both the rules themselves, and
perhaps more importantly, the ways in which they
are enforced, vary from club to club; indeed, within a
club both the rules, and the methods of enforcement,
may change when there is a change of manager. 
All the managers interviewed saw the establishment
of club rules as a key method of controlling the
behaviour of their players. One manager described
how he established the code of discipline at his club:
When I took over … we had rules of conduct
at the club. There was one [set of rules]
previously, but I got the lads to sign up to it …
if players were late they got fined. I would
never fine players for bookings. You know for
verbal maybe [e.g. remonstrating with a
referee]. We had little funny fines, like [for not
wearing] flip flops [in the shower]…which went
into a fund for a drink the end of the season.
All the players interviewed described how each club
had its own particular mechanisms for controlling
players’ behaviour, based largely on the
idiosyncrasies of the manager. However, central to all
rules was the fining of players who breached those
rules. One player said:
The Beautiful Game? Maintaining Club
Discipline in Professional Football
Every club has it; it’s a discipline thing. When
you go into football, as soon as you go into
football you know what the done thing is so
you don’t complain about it. You know, you’re
one-minute late [for training] and you’re fined
a fiver.
Players generally felt that the manager saw financial
penalties as a way of hitting them where it hurt
most: in their pockets. However, several players -
especially those who had played with Premier
League clubs in England - pointed out that in the
higher leagues, where players’ incomes may be very
high, the effect of fining players is very limited. One
player said:
Obviously when players step out of line, what
the managers do is fine the player, because
they feel that that’s what hurts them most, hit
their pocket. But there is so much money now
… if you look in the Premiership, and the top
teams and you’re fining players, the big, big
names, it’s like nothing to them.
Different managers lay particular stress on different
aspects of players’ behaviour, and it is perhaps here
that the arbitrary elements of club discipline are
most evident. For example, several players stated
that some managers have what they (the players)
regard as a fixation with punctuality, while others
have very strict guidelines relating to ‘off field
behaviour’. Several players commented on what they
saw as the obsession of some managers with players’
weight and diet. One player described a previous
manager who weighed his players every Monday
morning in an attempt to identify those players who
had had what the player described as ‘a good
weekend’. Another player described a similar
experience and added:
It was crazy, like some of us would starve
ourselves on a Sunday in case we were
overweight. Sometimes he would run us into the
ground. Other times he would just fine us. We
actually had a ‘fat squad’ for all those players
who the manager reckoned needed to lose
weight. They used to be run into the ground.
The Socialisation of Apprentices and Young
Professionals
The induction period for a young trainee can be an
intimidating experience. Professional football is an
aggressive, tough, masculine – and at times violent –
industry, and these values are reflected in its
workplace behaviours and in the socialisation and
social control of young players. In his research on the
careers of professional footballers, Roderick3 noted the
advice of a coach at an English Premier League club
to his young players: ‘smile, be happy in your life, but
when you cross that line, whether it is training or a
match, you’ve got to become a bastard. You’ve got to
be a hard, tough bastard’.
All the players who were interviewed were asked to
describe their experience of their first manager in
professional football. The responses were strikingly
similar, with a recurring theme being not just their
fear of the manager but also the manager’s use of
verbal and physical abuse to intimidate young
players and to induce fear:
Player: I remember [the manager] was under a
bit of pressure at the time. It’s not an easy world
to live in. I mean the youngsters used to get
assaulted all the time. They are just trying to
toughen you up I think, and [there was violence]
from senior pro’s as well. And the manager
especially, there would be a fear there you know.
Interviewer: So were you afraid of the
manager?
Player: Yeah, I think especially when you are
younger and just getting started. As you get
older the fear goes away a bit and you’d stand
up for yourself a bit.
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All the players recalled their fear of their managers
and coaches when they were young players. One
player recounted his experiences as a young
professional in a Premier League club in England:
Oh God it was frightening. He was totally the
hardest manager I have ever come across. He
f*****g didn’t take any s**t at all. Sort of old
school in terms of behaviour ... But you pretty
much got the drift of it [his approach] after an
hour with him. He was very strict. There was
a fear factor with him, total fear factor. There
was a fear factor that if you didn’t perform,
you were out. He’d hammer you. He would
verbally abuse you if you didn’t do it.
The physical and verbal abuse administered to
apprentices and young professionals was a recurrent
theme in the players’ responses. Another player
described his manager’s approach as follows: 
He would hurl abuse at you all the time. In
front of other players, in the office, on your
own, or in the office in front of the coach and
staff. Now it brought out the best in me. It did
bring out the best in me. But I know not all
players could hack it, they just couldn’t hack it.
I know I asked once what his policy on being
late was, how much were we fined you know.
You weren’t late, that was his policy. I think
that all players know it. If you are a young lad
just coming in, then a manager will just take
their frustration out on young players generally.
Physical violence may also be used as a means of
intimidating young players. One interviewee spoke
about his experiences as a youth team player at an
English Premier League club. When asked about the
manager’s approach to players, he stated that the
manager would ‘frighten the life out of you, he would
use bully tactics ... sure, he used to hit players’. He
added:
I remember [the manager] smacked us all in
the head with a cricket bat once. We had
training and I remember I was a youth team
player at the time, and we used to get kitted in
the morning and then get changed, put on fresh
kit, go up [for food] but we were meant to put
the old kit in the wash bags for the wash man
to wash, but I think [the manager] walked by
and saw the kit on the ground, went up to his
office and got the cricket bat out. He lined us
all up, turned the cricket bat to one side … and
smacked us all on the head. Yeah, and it was a
good hard smack as well.
In describing in more detail this manager’s technique
for controlling players, he said:
He would square up to you and everything.
Oh, he would have no problems in giving you
a clip, and it hurt … he didn’t really care. I
mean, he was so successful with all the
players that he worked with. I mean everyone
respected him because he knew what he was
doing, everyone was afraid of not doing [what
he wanted] ...but on the pitch it would be
bully tactics all the way. I mean if you crossed
him then it’s the worst, he is the worst person
ever to cross. It’s like the end of the world.
Players would be so afraid of him, that’s how
he got players to do what he said. Players
would just do exactly what he said.
Intimidation as an Instrument of Managerial Control
Roderick has suggested that ‘workplace behaviours in
professional football are more robust and masculine
than in any other industry’. Verbal abuse and
intimidation, and sometimes the use, or threats, of
physical violence, are all aspects of this ‘robust and
masculine’ culture, and not just with respect to young
players. Although young players are particularly
vulnerable to abuse and intimidation, there is evidence,
both from our own data and from the autobiographical
writings of professional players, that these techniques
are also used against more experienced players. For
example, one player described how players were
punished for defensive errors (even in training) and for
losing matches by being made to do additional
running, sometimes at 6 am:
When we trained, if someone got a clear shot
at goal then he would stop training and make
us run for twenty minutes. [For] any mistakes
at all.  We were terrified to make mistakes. It
was entirely based on fear. We were scared.
After matches that we lost, he would have us
in at six in the morning running. 
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In his autobiography, Mick Quinn, the former
Coventry and Newcastle player, described the abuse
and violence to which even senior players may be
subject:
On one occasion we came in at half time after
what was admittedly a poor performance. He
[the manager] smashed all the teacups against
the wall above our heads as we sat on the
benches. ‘You were a f****** disgusting
shower of s**t out there’. He pointed to Tony
Quinn and screamed; ‘You f*****g stank out
there, get in the f*****g shower’…Tony got up
and left. So he turned to me, ‘What’s the
f*****g matter with you, Quinn?’ ‘Well’, I
replied, ‘if you got off our backs, we might be
able to play’. ‘Get in the f*****g shower! You’re
off’ he screamed. So I joined Tony in the baths.
The message conveyed to players was
unambiguously clear: the manager’s authority was
not to be questioned. Those players who did
question it were punished, in the above case by
being withdrawn from the game. Elsewhere in the
book, Quinn describes the arrival of a new manager,
Larry Lloyd, at Wigan Football Club. The players
were waiting in the players lounge to meet the
manager. Quinn described what happened as follows: 
Larry slammed the door open, nearly taking it
off its hinges, strode in and bellowed ‘Hello, I’m
Larry Lloyd. If you don’t like what I’m going to
say then I’m going to head-butt you’. Everyone
looked at one another in amazement.
Other professional players have recorded not just the
threat, but also the use, of violence, by managers
against players. For example, in his biography, Roy
Keane described how the Nottingham Forest
manager, Brian Clough – who is regarded by many
people as one of the greatest of English managers –
reacted to an error by Roy Keane in an important FA
cup match:
When I walked into the dressing room after
the game, Clough punched me straight in the
face. ‘Don’t pass the ball back to the
goalkeeper,’ he screamed as I lay on the floor,
him standing over me. I was hurt and
shocked, too shocked to do anything but nod
my head in agreement. Dressing rooms can
be hard, unforgiving places. Being knocked
down by Clough was part of my learning
curve. Knowing the pressure he was under, I
didn’t hold the incident against him. He never
said sorry.
In not dissimilar fashion, Steve Claridge described
being assaulted by his manager John Beck when he
was substituted at half time as a player with
Cambridge United. Claridge describes the incident as
follows: 
At half time I was in the medical room when
[the manager] came in, obviously ready for a
showdown, and told me to get into the dressing
room.  ‘I’m not doing an effing thing you say
any more,’ I told him. ‘Just stick it up your
arse’. He flew at me, trying to head-butt me ...
He came at me again, swinging his fists, but I
connected first and punched him in the eye…
Anyway, he then took a run at me but I
gripped him in a headlock and started
punching him… He was kicking and punching
back at me. His assistant, Gary Peters …
came round the blind side and I was also
trying to fend him off. It was pandemonium.
At this point Liam Daish arrived and grabbed
Beck, while Peters grabbed me and held us
apart. We were pulled apart. ‘I’ll see you after
the game’, Beck spat at me. 
There is some evidence to suggest that the use of
various forms of managerial intimidation is so
commonplace in professional football that most
players not only accept it as a routine part of the life
of a professional footballer, but that some players
may actually have difficulty in adapting to less
authoritarian, and more open and democratic styles
of management. This was certainly the view of one
experienced manager whom we interviewed. The
manager in question had been appointed to an
English Premier League club at which the previous
manager used abusive and violent tactics similar to
those described by Quinn in the example above. In
his interview, the manager described how some
players at the club had difficulty in adapting to his
quiet and more thoughtful style of management:
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Manager: It was my style of leadership, which
maybe was unusual for them.
Interviewer: Yes, tell me about your style of
leadership.
Manager: I am quiet and I am very analytical.
When they lost a game under their previous
manager, he would kick in the door and kick
players, and lift them up to the wall and say
various things … he was very angry. He was
furious after he [lost] a match. He was
managing through fear. He was scaring the
players. Then I came in and was very quiet,
and I would say that we would watch the
match [on video] tomorrow.
Conclusion
The research reported here examines aspects of the
relationship between professional soccer managers
and their players, with particular emphasis on the
issue of enforcing discipline in professional soccer
clubs. More specifically this paper focuses on the
ways in which disciplinary codes are established by
managers and the sanctions, which are imposed on
players for breaches of club discipline. The paper
also highlights the arbitrary character of these codes
and the central part played by intimidation and
abuse, both verbal and physical, in maintaining
discipline within clubs.
It is difficult to imagine any other industry in which
abuse, intimidation and violence of this kind would be
regarded as legitimate instruments of managerial
control; indeed, outside the relatively closed social
world of professional football, these techniques would
almost universally be regarded not just as bad
management practice, but they would almost certainly
result in cases being brought to industrial tribunals and
would probably also result in criminal prosecutions.
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Patrick Murphy
The Rise of Football Hooliganism to the Status of a
Serious Social Problem
How did football hooliganism come to be perceived as
a serious social problem in England? Prior to the late
1950s, the football crowd disorders that did occur in
the U.K. tended to go unreported. The only disorders
that were given extensive coverage in the English
media occurred abroad and these seem to have been
reported upon for their novelty value. The reporting
style was smug and took the tone  - ‘what will these
crazy foreigners do next?’ These disorders occurred in
South America and Southern Europe. They tended to
be explained in terms of the ‘Latin temperament‘.
The media's benign approach to English football
crowd disturbances began to change in the later
1950s. In this period, great concern was expressed
over youthful violence in other social contexts and, in
particular, the focus was upon the disorderly
behaviour of teddy boys. Concern about hooliganism
in one area of social life generated a more
generalised anxiety on the part of the media and the
public at large. In consequence, Association Football
was one of the areas that received closer scrutiny.
The disorders that had to varying degrees long
characterised the professional game in England
began to be reported in more dramatic relief.  An
early peak in this concern occurred during the built-
up to the 1966 World Cup Finals. The newly
emerging tabloid press worked itself up into
something of frenzy over the possibility that disorder
would tarnish England's reputation under the full
glare of the world's media. Also around this time, the
popular press began sending reporters to matches to
focus upon the crowd rather than the game itself.
Not surprisingly, more and more incidents began to
be reported and, with this increased reportage came
the establishment of new thresholds of press
sensationalism. In the course of the 1960s, this
consistently dramatic presentation of match-days and
football grounds as times and places in which
fighting and could be engaged in and aggressive
masculinity displayed, attracted growing numbers of
young males bent on making a disorderly
contribution to the proceedings. This was a gradual
process. In fact, it was not until the later 1960s that
English football hooliganism began to take on its
distinctively recognisable form with the establishment
of more organised gangs. 
Over the period from the late 1960s to the end of
the 1980s, media treatment of football hooliganism
was characterised by two overarching tendencies - a
predominant one and a weaker, countervailing one.
The predominant tendency was for the media to
depict football hooliganism as meaningless behaviour
and to characterise the hooligans themselves as
mindless morons, beasts and animals. No doubt this
kind of reaction provided some emotional comfort. It
did not, however, advance our understanding of the
phenomenon one iota. On the contrary, it closed off
any possibility of greater understanding. To define
something as meaningless is to render it incapable of
being understood. From time to time, another
characterisation of football hooliganism emerged in
the media. This one explained the behaviour in terms
of a conspiracy orchestrated by extreme right-wing
groups. While this characterisation contains a germ
of truth, it remains a crude over-simplification.
However, in this context, the point to stress is the
way in which the media over this period happily
swung from a position which depicted football
hooliganism as ‘mindless’ behaviour to one which
characterised it as ‘highly rational’. That the editors
were willing to live with these inconsistencies is
understandable in terms of their commercial interests
and, in particular, their desire to sell newspapers in
the context of a circulation war. Both approaches
could generate sensational headlines. It is beyond
question that the reporting style of the tabloid press
in particular made a substantial contribution towards
the escalation of the phenomenon in the 1970s and
1980s and to shaping its form.
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Revisiting Football Hooliganism:
England from the late 1950s to 1990
The upshot of these media presentations was to
bring considerable pressure to bear on the football
authorities and successive governments. The cry
went out that something must be done to control this
threat to public order. The culprits must be caught,
brought to justice and severely punished. Politicians
found themselves under considerable pressure to act
before they were quite sure what to do.  For the most
part, this official reaction took the form of control
and containment measures. In this context, it is
appropriate to pick up the story in the late 1960s
early 1970s when the Lang Report (1969)
recommended that football clubs install a system of
fences and pens in their grounds to control the rival
hooligan groups and provide greater security for
orderly fans. These new arrangements certainly made
grounds safer for peaceful spectators. They were far
less likely to be engulfed by marauding hooligans
charging across open terraces. However, these same
policies also had important unintended
consequences. Concentrating the rival hooligan
groups in particular parts of the ground enhanced
their feelings of solidarity and their capacity to
organise. These emerging characteristics found
expression in a greater level of disorder outside the
ground in the pre- and post-match phases. Thus, we
begin to see the emergence of the process of
displacement that came to be a central characteristic
the police/hooligan dialectic. The police responded to
the greater level of disorder and violence outside the
ground by meeting the visiting fans at the local
railway and bus stations, marching them to the
ground, penning them and then escorting them back
at the end of the game. In response to this strategy,
those hooligans who were determined to continue
their involvement in serious disorder began to discard
their flamboyant styles in favour of less conspicuous
fashions. To avoid police surveillance they began to
travel on ordinary scheduled train services rather
than football excursion trains. They arrived in host
towns or cities hours before the kick-off and made
their way to city centre pubs, sought out the local
hooligans and engaged in hostilities. These tactics
also enabled them to evade the home club's
segregation arrangements and cause further disorder
inside grounds. The central frustration for the
authorities was that every attempt at containment
squeezed the problem into another phase of match-
day and from the mid-1970s this process of
displacement took a new turn. Groups of English
hooligans began to follow their clubs and the
national side into continental Europe and their
activities culminated in the Heysel disaster of 1985
when 39 people were killed.
Some Examples of Single Causal Explanations
Alcohol Consumption
Single causal explanations for football hooliganism
have long been popular. They are easy to grasp and
don’t tax the brain. Alcohol has been more or less
continuously cited as the cause of football
hooliganism. It is certainly the case that alcohol has
been a central part of the culture of those groups
engaged in football hooliganism. The ability to
consume large quantities of beer is seen as a mark of
manly status. However, it cannot be said to be a
deep cause of these disorders because not all the
hooligans drink, while many non-hooligans do drink
in the context of match days. It has also been the
case that some hooligans have claimed to abstain
from drinking during certain phases of match-day
because a clear head was essential if they were to
outwit their rivals and the police. The fact is that
many members of these groups are relatively
aggressive without drink. Of course, alcohol did put
an edge on this aggression, but it is only an element
in a more complex explanation. It is also the case
that football hooligans themselves helped to foster
the link between football hooliganism and alcohol
consumption. If, for example, a football hooligan
found himself in court charged with assault and was
asked to explain his behaviour, he may well have
asked himself the question:  ‘What sort of
explanation is more likely to lead to a lesser
sentence? ‘I was out of my head because I’d drunk
too much’ or ‘I get a buzz out of violence’ The
answer is self-evident.
Violence on the Field of Play
Another popular explanation for football hooliganism
has been in terms of player violence. Again, some
evidence can be provided to support an apparent
cause/effect link between a violent incident during a
match and a violent response from some of the fans.
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Nevertheless, it is more appropriate to see violent
play as a pretext for a hooligan response. After all,
only a minority of fans react to violence on the pitch
in this disorderly way. In any case, many incidents of
disorder occurred in the pre-match context and,
therefore, cannot possibly be ‘caused’ by particular
incidents during the match itself. 
The Wider View
In addition to attributing football hooliganism to a
single cause, the above explanations see the problem
of football hooliganism as being rooted specifically in
football. In contrast, let me offer a highly condensed
version of the explanation my colleagues and I
constructed as a result of our researches1. Let me
begin by identifying two persistent and obvious
characteristics of football hooliganism in England.
First of all, football hooliganism is overwhelmingly a
male preserve and, secondly, hooligans are not
peaceful citizens. They derive satisfaction from
engaging in aggressive activities. If these two
characteristics are drawn together, we are in a
position to establish a provisional definition of football
hooliganism. It is a form of aggressive masculinity; it
is expressive of an aggressive masculine style. What
else do we know about these hooligans? All the
systematic evidence that has been compiled on the
social class background of football hooligans in
England indicates that they come, not exclusively, but
predominantly from lower class communities. The
predominantly working-class character of football
hooliganism gives rise to a question - what is it about
the structure of certain lower-class communities and
the position they occupy in the broader society that
generates this distinctive and intense aggressive
masculine style? It is a style that finds expression not
only at football matches, but also within their
communities, in pubs and clubs, in towns and city
centres on a Saturday night and in other venues, such
as popular holiday resorts. Let us reflect at greater
length on this type of community. When compared to
other communities, they seem to exert relatively little
pressure on individuals - and in particular, males - to
exercise self-control over the use of physical
aggression. The higher levels of aggression
characteristic of relationships within these
communities in turn foster and sustain higher levels of
tolerance towards this aggression. In addition, other
aspects of these communities seem to work in the
same general direction. For example, the relatively
rigid division of labour between the sexes and the
dominance of men over women tends to minimise
any potential that there might otherwise be of a
softening female influence. Indeed, many women in
these communities grow up to be relatively aggressive
themselves and to expect relatively aggressive
behaviour from their males and this serves to
reinforce the aggressive propensities of their men.
These standards of behaviour find expression in a
range of conflicts within these communities, such as
the regular occurrence of family feuds, but they
probably find their strongest expression in what are
sometimes referred to as ‘street corner gangs‘. These
gangs or alliances seem to have their origins in the
comparative freedom from adult control experienced
by many lower class children and adolescents - in
particular males. Pushed out on to the street at an
early age, they inter-act relatively aggressively with
one another. For defensive and aggressive purposes,
they develop dominance hierarchies based on age and
physical strength. The conferral of prestige on males
who can fight encourages them to develop a love of
fighting and to come to see fighting as a central
source of meaning and gratification in their lives.
Indeed, for many, it is one of the few sources of
status available to them.
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Nevertheless, while such communities tend to be
internally divided by a range of conflicts their
members still have the capacity to gain a degree of
overall unity as a result of a threat or perceived
threat from outsiders. These may be more powerful
outsiders, such as authority figures, like police
officers, but of more relevance here is the threat –
perceived or otherwise - posed by similarly placed
outsider groups in adjacent lower class communities;
communities with members who have undergone
similar processes of socialisation and are subject to
similar social constraints. Therefore, while they are
characteristically divided, these communities do
possess a capacity to combine in the event of ‘an
external challenge’. Indeed, it is the nature of this
threat which seems to determine the level at which
alliances are formed. Let me illustrate this point by
returning to the issue of football hooliganism. Just as
otherwise hostile groups in a community combine in
the event of a dispute with a rival community, in the
context of football matches, they are prepared to
combine in the cause of football club solidarity. If the
challenge is perceived in regional terms, club
enemies have been known to join forces. At
international level, these community, club and
regional rivalries have tended to be subordinated to
the defence of the national reputation. Finally, in the
context of international tournaments, hooligan groups
from different countries have on occasions formed
alliances. At the same time, at each of these levels,
particularly if the opposition groups do not turn up in
sufficient strength to constitute a credible challenge,
lower level rivalries have been apt to re-emerge. The
general point to grasp is that it is the nature of the
opposition which tends to determine the level at
which the temporary alliance is formed.
Football crowd disorders occur in many countries
throughout the world. In some countries this
behaviour has a political dimension. In others it
coalesces with religious conflicts. In yet others it is
an expression of ethnic divisions. In addition, there
are also societal variations in the social origins of
the participants and this can only be understood in
terms of the specific histories of these countries.
The common core of these variations on the form
taken by football hooliganism seems to be that they
are predominantly a male activity, an expression of
male aggression.
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From the perspective of someone interested in
football hooliganism, the period since 1990 has been
one of the most fascinating and least explored. In
this regard, the World Cup Finals in Italy in that
same year constituted something a watershed in the
transformation of the prevailing image of the English
game. From the late 1960s to 1990, football
hooliganism was routinely regarded as one of
England's major social problems. It caused the
football authorities much consternation, it generated
little short of apoplexy in sections of the media, it
absorbed significant amounts of Parliamentary time
and it was perceived as having a highly detrimental
impact on England's international reputation. So
much so, that at one point in the late 1980s, the
Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, threatened to
close down the English professional game. It is
against this backcloth that the period from 1990
onwards needs to be understood.
The years 1989 and 1990 were characterised by a
number of important developments. Following the
Hillsborough disaster, the Government resolved to
impose a new range of controls on football. In
particular, Thatcher wanted the blanket introduction
of an identity card system. The vehicle for this
ambition was to be the Football Spectator Act.
However, this strategy was undermined by Lord
Justice Taylor's report on the Hillsborough Disaster
which came out very firmly against identity cards.
The drive towards this objective was further
weakened by Thatcher's removal from office. John
Major replaced her and, unlike his predecessor, he
had a long-standing interest in football. There was
also substantial pressure from the All Party
Parliamentary Committee on Football for a new and
distinctively more sympathetic approach to the game.
Major’s Government also embraced a
recommendation of the Taylor Report, namely, that
football stadia should undergo a radical programme
of modernisation and, to this end the new
government ensured that the ‘Football Trust’ was
geared up to help clubs finance this operation. In the
same year, the Government withdrew its opposition
to the FA's annual application to UEFA for the re-
admission of English clubs to European cup
competitions, following the ban imposed after the
Heysel disaster. As a result of these combined
processes, the football problem was, in effect, more
or less depoliticised, at least as far as Westminster
was concerned.
It was against this more positive backcloth that
England embarked upon its World Cup campaign in
Italy. On the spectator front, while some England
fans were involved in disorderly incidents during the
World Cup Tournament, in retrospect one can detect
the emergence of a less sensationalistic style of
reporting on the part of the UK media. Moreover,
great prominence was given to the award of the FIFA
‘Fair Play’ Trophy to the England team. Even the fact
that the team's semi-final exit on penalties was
followed by disorders in some 60 towns and cities in
England was not allowed to detract from the
burgeoning feel-good factor. Since Italia 90 and for
most of the 1990s the picture emanating from
Government circles, the football authorities and the
media has been that, save the odd hiccup or two,
the problem of football hooliganism had more or less
been resolved. Politicians, football officials and the
media were not the only groups that embraced this
view. A number of academics were equally
susceptible to the seductive attractions of the feel-
good factor. For example, Ian Taylor referred to the
‘extraordinary absence of hooliganism and other ugly
incidents from English football grounds during the
1990-91 season’. His observations led him to write
of ‘an astonishing sea-change taking place in the
culture of some of England's football terraces.’ He
concluded that ‘hooliganism has suddenly become
decidedly unfashionable, passé, irrelevant’1.
In a State of denial: Football
hooliganism in England in the 1990s
This then was the pervasive image of the English
game that emerged after the 1990 World Cup. Let
us now take a step back from the prevailing
consensus and engage in a rather more measured
appraisal of the period. It is important to begin by
recognising the momentous changes which
characterised the development of English Football in
the 1990s; the establishment of the Premier League
in 1992; the advent of satellite television; the influx
of overseas players; the implications of the Bosman
ruling and the growing commercialisation of the
game. The climate of denial surrounding the hooligan
problem was associated with some of these
developments. A central plank in the prevailing view
that the hooligan problem had been resolved was
that the new all-seated stadia had somehow
‘civilised’ the behaviour or deterred the attendance of
the hooligan fans. This process was further
facilitated, so the argument goes, by the concerted
effort to try to transform football into a ‘safe,’ family
game. The official line focused unblinkingly on
football grounds. At the beginning of the 1995-96
season, at the instigation of the Home Office, a
police press conference was held. Its central purpose
was to publicly celebrate the progress that had been
made in the struggle to defeat football hooliganism
and, by way of confirmation of progress to date, it
was announced that the number of arrests made in
and around football stadia when compared with the
previous season had fallen by 9%. Before accepting
this figure at face value (and we will return to the
issue of its validity later in the paper), it is as well to
recognise that the statistics relating to arrests at and
ejections from football grounds have always been
highly problematic. They have always revealed more
about the diverse strategies of different police forces
than they have about the activities of hooligans.
What then is the countervailing evidence that
challenges the prevailing thesis of the 1990s that
football hooliganism had been more or less defeated?
Let's begin with those disturbances that received
more publicity, such as when England fans rioted in
Sweden in 1992, in Amsterdam in 1993, in Dublin
in 1995 and the battles that took place on the
streets of Marseilles during the World Cup in France
in 1998. The disorders in Marseilles involved an
estimated 600 to 700 English hooligans.  In the face
of the disturbances in Sweden and Amsterdam
proponents of the ‘football hooliganism is dead
thesis’ tried to maintain their position by arguing that
English hooligans have become peaceful at home
and only engage in violence abroad.  
To demonstrate the weakness of this proposition, one
only has to recall the events following England’s
elimination by penalties at the semi-final stage of the
Euro 96. The Daily Mail report reads as follows:
The agonising moment when Gareth
Southgate’s penalty was saved … was the
trigger for a night of sustained hooliganism.
Draped in flags and brandishing bottles,
thousands spilled out of pubs and bars …
within moments of Germany’s victory … The
worse flashpoint came in Trafalgar Square… [I]t
was the centre of … orchestrated rampage …
Up to 2,000 people poured into the square
shortly after 10.06 pm … [T]he situation
rapidly deteriorated  … Cars and motorists …
found themselves engulfed in the rapidly-
escalating violence with German Volkswagens
and Mercedes quickly singled out. A hard core
of 400 hooligans … burst out of the square and
attacked a police patrol car. The two officers
inside had to flee for their lives as in less than a
minute the car was smashed to pieces. The
hooligans surged towards the Thames,
shattering windscreens, turning one vehicle over
and setting fire to a Japanese sports car …
Between 10.10 pm and midnight, police
received 2,500 calls requesting urgent help. Of
these 730 were related to violent disturbances
… The final toll around Trafalgar Square was
40 vehicles damaged, six overturned and two
set alight. Seven buildings were damaged with
25 police officers and 23 members of the
public injured across London, as well as a
further 18 casualties, both police and civilians,
in Trafalgar Square itself … Nearly 200 people
were arrested across London with 40 held
during ugly scenes in Trafalgar Square.2
Yet within months, the authorities and the media
were gripped by a kind of collective amnesia as the
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Government gave its active support to the bid for the
2006 World Cup.   For example, reflecting on Euro
96, Martin Thorpe writes that the authorities
achievement in ‘avoiding trouble off it [the field] will
go down well with FIFA when it chooses a venue for
the second World Cup of the new century’.3
Given the policy of denial that prevailed through
most of the 1990s, systematic evidence on disorders
in the context of domestic football is not easily
acquired. We have, however, managed to obtain
some data. Consider following statistics supplied by
the British Transport Police (BTP): 
Football-related incidents known to British Transport Police, 1990-1994
Number of
Season Incidents
1990-1991 (21/8/90 to 5/6/91 - includes end-of season play offs) 204
1991-1992 (21/8/90 to 5/6/91 - includes end of season play offs
and one international) 260
1992-1993 (8/8/92 to 31/5/93) 127      
1993-1994 (24/7/93 to 22/12/93 - first half of season only) 64
1990-1994 (incidents in conjunction with pre-season friendlies) 12
___
Total 667___
Thus, the BTP recorded a total of 667 incidents in
the context of travel to and from football matches
between August 1990 and December 1993 - a
period of some three and a half seasons - and, of
course, it is important to bear in mind that the
sphere of operations of the BTP is but one dimension
of match days. It should also be appreciated that
these data, like all statistical data, are not
unproblematic. A more careful assessment of them
would entail determining the assumptions and
practices underlying their compilation and the ways
in which these procedures might have changed over
time. Nevertheless, contrary to the prevailing view in
official and media circles, they do indicate that, in
broad terms, football hooliganism had far from
disappeared in this period. What is particular worthy
of note is that hardly any of these incidents were
reported in the media. The same observation applies
to the following information obtained from a source
in the Police Intelligent Unit:
Selected incidents of football hooliganism at or in conjunction with matches in 
England and Wales - Season 1992 -1993
Date Match Details
7/10/92 Notts. Forest v Stockport CS gas, 8 police officers hurt
18/10/92 Sunderland v Newcastle U. 30 arrests & 200 ejections
31/10/92 Leyton O. v Swansea Fights in London (Marble Arch)
31/10/92 Grimsby v Portsmouth Missiles thrown at players
14/11/92 Darlington v Hull C. Pub fights in city centre & station
16 & 24/11/92 Stoke C. v Port Vale Fights inside & outside ground & town centre 
19/12/92 Chelsea v Man U. CS gas thrown in Covent Garden pub
12/1/93 Southend v Millwall Pitch invasion, pub fights
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16/1/93 Tranmere Fan beaten to death (seems motive was more 
racial than football-related)
19/1/93 Cardiff v Swansea Pitch invasion & pub fights
30/1/ 93 Leicester v West Ham Fights outside ground, CS gas thrown in pub
20/2/93 Spurs v Leeds 300 in fight, CS gas thrown in pub
5/3/93 Spurs & Blackpool Fighting in Blackpool prior to Spurs/Man C. match
7/3/93 Man C. v Spurs Pitch invasion & fighting outside ground
17/3/93 England U18 v Ghana U18 Attack on police
3/4/93 Shef Wed. v Shef U. Fighting, murder
3/4/93 Millwall v Portsmouth Pub fights, missiles thrown
24/4/93 Peterborough v Leicester Pitch invasion, arson
28/4/93 England v Holland Pub fights, police attacked
1/5/93 Reading v Swansea Fights inside & outside the ground, pitch invasion
2/5/93 Aston V. v Oldham Disturbances in Oldham, riot police in action
4/5/93 Exeter v Port V. Referee attacked by fans
8/5/93 Millwall v Bristol R. Pitch invasion, missiles thrown
8/5/93 Halifax v Hereford Fighting inside ground, mounted police used
Div. 1 Play-off Portsmouth v Leicester Fighting outside ground
semi-final                 (Notts. Forest ground)
Div. 1 Play-off Swindon v Leicester Leicester hooligans ransacked Wembley pub
Final (Wembley) Disturbances in Swindon
If we focus upon the 1992-93 season, the season
covered in both sets of data, we find that 154
incidence were officially recorded. The vast majority
of these occurred outside or at some distance from
football grounds. As such they were less likely to be
seen by the media. However, since the police
recorded these incidents, it remains to be explained
why these disorders were not brought to the media’s
attention and, if they were, why the media deemed
them to be insufficiently newsworthy to warrant
coverage. The focus of the 1995 Police Press
Conference, referred to earlier, was upon the decline
in number of arrests inside grounds and within the
vicinity of grounds. The arrest figure for football
related offences at some distance from grounds
would have provided a more rounded picture of
match-day behaviour, but it was not disclosed. It
transpires that the police were in fact under
instructions from the Home Office not to reveal this
figure. It seems, however, that the missing figure
indicated a 71% increase in football related arrests
away from football grounds when compared with the
previous season. But why should the Home Office
and the police engage in this charade? One does not
have to search long for an answer. The primary aim
of the press conference was to provide substantive
proof of the progress made in the fight against
football hooliganism. Therefore, the figures were
selected to serve this purpose. This mission was
accomplished, with the assistance of gullible
journalists. It is the case that some football related
disorders were reported in the media in the 1990s,
but up until Euro 2000, they tended not to be
treated in the sensationalistic way similar disorders
were covered in the previous decades. The only
disorders that received rather more extensive
coverage were those that occur in two contexts.
Firstly, there were those disorders that happened
abroad and to which the international media paid
greater attention, such as the one in Dublin, on the
occasion of England's game against the Republic in
1995. Secondly, there were those disorders that
were sufficiently intrusive to demand reporting, such
as the riots following England’s exit from Euro 96
and, more recently, the pitch invasions that burst
onto our television screens in the context of
England’s game against Turkey in 2003 at the
Stadium of Light. When the problem broke through
the shield of official denial, understandably the
public - particularly the non-soccer going public -
were shocked. Having formed the belief that the
problem has been cracked, the reasons for its
seemingly sudden rebirth were difficult to fathom.
The official response has tended to involve bland
reassurances that this was but a blip. These
reassurances have also been accompanied by
unconvincing explanations, sometimes provided by
academics trying to dig themselves out of a hole of
their own creation. Cultivating a climate of denial no
doubt served some ulterior motives, but when the
official picture was shown to be at variance with
events on the ground, it fostered confusion.
Moreover, nurturing a belief that has little substance
cannot possibly constitute a firm basis on which to
develop an effective and more comprehensive
counter-hooligan strategy.
How can we begin to explain the belief that prevailed
for most of the 1990s that the problem of football
hooligan had all but disappeared? Clearly, there have
been vested interests involved, groups who had an
interest in reconstructing the image of football for
commercial, nationalistic and even party political
reasons. Elements of news management are also
apparent. It is, however, important to avoid falling
into the simplistic trap of embracing a conspiracy
theory. It is self-evidently the case that conspiracy is
part of social life. We all conspire on occasions. We
have all denied other people knowledge that would
have been relevant to their perceived interests. And,
of course, the more powerful the individual or group,
the greater is their capacity to control and shape the
flow of information. However, this recognition is a
long way short of embracing a full-blown conspiracy
theory whereby everything that happens in human
history is seen as a consequence of intrigue by the
powerful. The weakness of this approach stems from
the fact that the social world is too complex for any
person or group to exercise anything remotely like
this measure of control, no matter how powerful they
may be. Virtually everything people do in the course
of pursuing their interests has unforeseen
consequences. Having spoken to many journalists
about the under-reporting of football hooliganism
during the 1990s, I am persuaded that rather than
them being participants in a conspiracy of silence,
they are more aptly characterised as consumers of
the prevailing myth. From the Home Office
perspective - under both Conservative and Labour
administrations - there are substantial grounds for
suspecting an attempt to cultivate a rosy picture and
the figures were massaged to achieve this end. If
successive Home Secretaries had been willing to
acknowledge this strategy of denial, they might have
attempted to justify it on the grounds that it was
depriving the hooligans of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ or
that it was geared to the attempt to bring the World
Cup to England in 2006. While the first justification
is somewhat simplistic, it does contain a defendable
rationale, one perhaps inspired by the approach of
the Scottish football authorities over an extended
period of time. With regard to the second
justification, while the objective was understandable
and may have been shared by the majority of football
supporters, predictably, this strategy of denial proved
to be a very tenuous basis on which to mount the
World Cup campaign.  
There is perhaps another dimension to the strategy of
denial. The highly selective flow of information on
the issue of football hooliganism to the media and
through them to the public at large over this period
was probably engendered partly and, understandably,
by the government's distrust of the media and the
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electorate. The Government and state officials place
little faith in the ‘populist’ section of the media and
the public's capacity or desire to assess more
voluminous and complex data, and therefore,
Government and state officials have little confidence
in the ability of the media and the public at large to
draw balanced, measured conclusions. Given the
propensity of sections of the media for generating
moral panics and the willingness of the ‘public’ to
engage in them, there is more than an element of
truth in this view. But then, what have politicians as
a group done to cultivate a greater capacity for
balanced appraisal in the people they purport to
represent? It has been said that the electorate get the
politicians they deserve. That may be so, but given
the power inequalities involved, might it not be truer
to say that politicians get the electorate they
deserve? We live in a period where politicians are
often accused of ‘spin’ and many calls are made for
them to abandon this approach. In my view this is a
naïve aspiration because ‘spin’ is as old as politics.
The reality is that we live in a society where political
‘spinners’ are engaged in an on-going struggle with
‘spinners’ in the media. The hope that they will
forsake their spinning ways is a forlorn one. The
most effective way of offsetting the insidious effects
of news management techniques is to develop the
critical and analytical skills of citizens.
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Patrick Murphy
An overview of recent legislation
Under the Public Order 1986 ‘an exclusion order may
be made by a court when dealing with a person
convicted of a football-related offence, whether
committed on a journey to or from a match or at the
ground and two hours before or one hour after a
match…It prohibits the subject of the order from
attending any prescribed football match in England
and Wales for a given period… Orders are issued for a
minimum of three months and there is no maximum
duration. Breach of an order is a criminal offence
attracting a maximum sentence of one month’s
imprisonment or a level three fine (currently £1,000);
and the police can arrest a person they reasonably
suspect of committing such an offence’.  Under the
Football Spectator Act 1989 restriction orders were
introduced. They were an extension of the exclusion
principle to matches outside England and Wales.
Under the Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999,
exclusion orders were superseded by Domestic
Football Banning Orders, (DFBOs), and restriction
orders were replaced by International Football Banning
Orders, (IFBOs). The Football (Disorder) Act 2000
combined aspect of both domestic and international
football banning orders into one banning order.
How effective was the enforcement of this legislation?
What accounts for these changes in the law relating
to restrictions on who can and cannot attend football
matches at home and abroad? Exclusion orders were
introduced as a means of curtailing and controlling
disorderly behaviour at domestic matches and
restriction orders were a later application of the same
principle to football matches abroad. How effective
did they prove to be in practice? It has been claimed
that it is difficult to provide precise figures for the
number of orders in operation at any particular time
because they accumulate in the course of a season
and because the enforcement period for specific
orders is continuously lapsing. This, however, does
not seem to be a very persuasive argument on two
counts. Firstly, in practical terms, tracking these
developments does not appear to be a particularly
difficult technical problem. Secondly, monitoring how
effectively legislation is being implemented is surely
of crucial importance. One might be forgiven for
assuming that an efficient and effective monitoring
system would be an intrinsic component of any piece
of legislation. However, notwithstanding these
apparent difficulties, it is estimated that up to March
1996 some 6,303 exclusion orders were issued and
at this same point in time 308 were still in force.
According to the National Criminal Intelligence
Service (NCIS) by 14 April 1999 there were 385 in
force and another 50 were being processed and by
May 2000 there were 218 people subject to
exclusion orders made under the Football Spectator
Act 1986 and 170 subject to domestic banning
orders under the Football Offences and Disorder Act
1999. The figures for restriction orders (or as they
later became known, International Football Banning
Orders) are as follows: 
The Convoluted History of Recent
Legislative Attempts to Ban Football
Hooligans
Restriction and International Banning Orders
England & Wales 1990 to 2000
Orders made Restriction International Total Bans
1990 19 … 19
1991 4 … 4
1992 2 … 2
1993 nil … 0
1994 1 … 1
1995 1 … 1
1996 1 … 1
1997 10 … 10
1998 100 … 100 
1999 18 3 21
2000 (to end - June) … 28 28
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Thus, from 1986 until March 1996, 6,303 exclusion
orders were issued while from 1989 until June
2,000 only 187 restriction/IFBOs had been imposed.
While these figures are not for the same time
periods, it is still evident that over this time span
there was a substantial discrepancy between the
number of exclusion and restriction orders issued. On
the basis of these figures, approximately 573
exclusion orders were issued per annum between
1986 and 1996 and 15.5 restriction orders were
issued per annum between 1989 and 2000; a ratio
of nearly 40 to 1 in favour of the domestic variant.
Notwithstanding the data gathering and monitoring
problems, this discrepancy was recognised by
Government and became an issue of some concern.
In June 1995, Tony Baldry (then a junior Foreign
Office minister) said: ‘It is a reasonable inference
that, given the small number of restriction orders that
have been made, that the scheme is not working as
well as we would have wished’. On 31 May 1995 a
circular was issued to the police and the courts
reminding them of their legal powers to impose
restriction and exclusion orders. Yet this does not
seem to have had a marked effect on the number of
restriction orders issued, and in December 1997 the
Home Secretary announced that he had written to all
courts and prosecutors in England reminding them
again of the availability of these orders. Clearly, this
growing concern was related to the fact that not only
was the World Cup a mere six months away, the host
country, France, was a convenient destination for
English hooligans. In January 1998 only 9 restriction
orders were in force and this figure had only risen to
71 when the finals commenced in June. The number
of exclusion orders that were in force at this time
was between 600 and 700, but of course, those
subject to this type of order were not prevented from
travelling abroad to matches. The discrepancy
between the numbers subject to restriction and
exclusion orders may go some way towards
accounting for the involvement of some 700 English
hooligans in the disturbances on the streets of
Marseilles.
The disorders in France stimulated a legislative
response. The Football (Offences and Disorder) Act
1999 introduced Domestic Football Banning Orders
and International Football Banning Orders to
supersede the more ambiguously named exclusion
and restriction orders. It is interesting to compare the
bans relating to domestic and international matches.
In May 2000 388 people were subject to an
exclusion order or a DFBO, whereas only 106 were
subject to a restriction order or IFBO. Clearly, the
discrepancy between the use of exclusion and
restriction orders had not been resolved by this new
legislative reform. However, what is more surprising
is that when these figures are divided into those
pertaining to the old and the new system, we find
that there were 218 exclusion orders in this month
of May and 87 restriction orders. This compares with
170 DFBOs and only 19 IFBOs. Thus, under the
new legislation the ratio in favour of internal, as
opposed to external bans, rose by a factor of 3.6. 
The penny drops
On the eve of the 2000 European Championships in
Belgium and the Netherlands, much of the optimism
surrounding football’s hooligan problem had
dissipated and had been replaced by a more realistic
attitude. This found partial expression in the Football
(Disorder) Act 2000 that combined the two banning
orders. It may have been a growing appreciation of
People subject to Restriction International Total Bans
Orders as of
May 1995 2 …                             2
December 1997 10 …                            10
January 1998 9 …                              9
March 1998 30 …                             30
June 1998 71 …                             71
April 1999 113 …                           113
May 2000 87 19                           106   
how the legislation was being interpreted by the
courts that led Westminster to recognize that the
distinction between the domestic and international
dimensions was a self-created, superfluous obstacle
to their counter-hooligan strategy.
However, this more realistic approach came into
effect too late to make an appreciable, immediate
impact, hence the involvement of a substantial
number of English hooligans in the disturbances in
Belgium and the Netherlands. These disturbances
also helped to scupper England’s campaign to host
the 2006 World Cup. Nevertheless, the greater
effectiveness of combining the two banning orders in
the 2000 Act goes a long way towards accounting
for the fact that Euro-2004 was relatively free of
crowd disorder. But with the next World Cup in
Germany just a matter of months away, many of the
banning orders that prevented convicted hooligans
from attending the European Championships in
Portugal are lapsing. It will be interesting to see how
the authorities cope with this all too predictable
outcome of the legislation. Crisis management or to
call it by its more accurate and less professionally
sounding name –‘knee-jerkism’ - is often only made
necessary by a lack of reasonable foresight.      
What accounts for the gap between the legislation
and its enforcement?
The question remains, how did this discrepancy
between the counter-hooligan legislation and its use
by the courts arise? On the basis of inside
information it seems that the implementation of this
legislation was under-resourced and neither
magistrates nor the police were properly inducted
into its ‘subtleties’. This lack of due diligence also
seems to have found expression in the monitoring
procedures. This apparent failure to properly resource
the implementation and the monitoring of the
legislation may well have been associated with the
complacency that characterised both Conservative
and Labour Governments over the course of the
1990s. Seemingly, they were beguiled by the
illusionary effectiveness of their policy of
downplaying the scale of the football hooligan
problem. In effect they swallowed their own
propaganda. Under the Blair Government this
complacency also came to be tinged with a measure
of wishful thinking linked to the desire to bring the
2006 World Cup the England. Thus, pursuing a
policy of pushing the problem out of sight or, at
least, beyond the public gaze, proved to be self-
defeating. It provides an illuminating example of
collective self-deception. The paradox is that groups
who set out to deceive ended up pulling the wool
over their own eyes.
A supplementary, but nevertheless significant, point
is that the distinction between exclusion and
restriction orders never made any sense. From the
outset, when the courts decided to impose an
exclusion order on a convicted football hooligan,
there would have been nothing lost if it had been
combined with a restriction order. If the hooligan in
question was not in the habit of travelling abroad for
matches, he would have been unaffected by this
linkage. It would, however, be difficult for the courts
to determine a hooligan’s intentions to travel abroad
to attend matches in advance and, therefore,
combining the two orders would have provided an
additional element of security.  The central question
remains – Why, in a parliament well stocked with
‘legal brains’, did it take a decade for this self-
evident penny to drop?
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